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ABSTRACT 
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is an important mission for the 
Army and the Department of Defense. Inherent to this mission, and critical in its 
execution, is effective liaison, coordination, and integration of Army forces into the 
emergency response structures of local, state, and federal civilian agencies. An 
examination of two cases, the 2012 response to Hurricane Sandy and the 2016 Cascadia 
Rising earthquake response exercise, identifies several shortfalls in integration and 
coordination between the Army, other service components, and civil authorities. This 
thesis examines these shortfalls and provides a potential solution to correct them for 
future DSCA missions. This thesis suggests that a creation of a functional area and force 
structure within the Army that is dedicated to the Army’s DSCA mission would bridge 
the gap between the Army and its civilian partners at all levels. The new DSCA Corps 
would be responsible for civil-military liaison, relationship building, and integrated 
planning prior to a disaster. During a disaster, the DSCA Corps would provide a core of 
DSCA subject matter experts (SMEs) to facilitate the rapid deployment and integration of 
Title 10 and Title 32 forces in support of the civilian Incident Command System (ICS).   
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The system that facilitates Department of Defense (DOD) support of civil 
authorities during homeland security emergencies requires that local, state, and federal 
civilian resources be exhausted or in danger of exhaustion before DOD support can be 
provided. This system and its authorities are outlined in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), enacted into federal law in 1988 as 
an amendment to the existing Disaster Relief Act of 1974. Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities (DSCA) is the method by which DOD provides federal military support to 
civilian authorities during homeland emergencies. Joint Publication 3-28, which governs 
DSCA within the DOD, states, “DOD resources are provided only when response or 
recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of local, state, and federal civil 
authorities, and when they are requested by a federal agency with lead responsibility and 
approved by SecDef” (Department of Defense, JP3-28–DSCA, viii-ix).  
Historically, this has worked well most of the time. The Army has successfully 
provided support to civil authorities since the founding of the U.S. in 1776, but this 
support is not always as effective as it could be. The DOD has taken steps over the years 
to make the support more efficient, largely through improved policy and training. Since 
9/11, the Army has engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have stretched the 
Army and its soldiers to their limits. Training for DSCA missions was neglected for over 
a decade, while the Army struggled to maintain a combat-ready force. Consequently, an 
integration problem developed that became apparent in the response to Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005. National Guard forces in the affected states were largely deployed overseas 
when the hurricane struck. Active Army forces from all over the U.S., many of which had 
recently returned from combat rotations, were sent to provide DSCA. Their lack of 
training in this important mission set was never more obvious than when Lieutenant 
General Russel Honore, the Task Force Commander, went on television stating that the 
Army was in control of operations in New Orleans. Army forces attempted to conduct 
DSCA in the same manner they would combat operations against enemy forces. 
Conducting operations within the U.S. independent from direction by civil authorities is a 
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violation of Federal Law and the laws in most states. Honore’s statements gave the 
impression that the military was in command of the hurricane response efforts, rather 
than providing resources to support the civilian emergency management command 
structure. In DSCA, unlike conventional operations, the military does not direct 
operations or control territory; it must only serve in a supporting role (Wombwell, 2009, 
157). 
The problem lies with the Army; it has both a lack of understanding of the civilian 
emergency response structures and processes and also a tendency to take charge of 
operations rather than deferring to civil authorities. In order to save lives and mitigate 
property damage, it is important for multiple agencies to rapidly integrate and cooperate 
to respond to disasters. The Army needs to find a way to improve its ability to integrate 
with civil authorities rapidly and effectively in order to make a positive impact on 
disaster response operations rather than detracting from them. This thesis will research 
the current conditions and how we can improve upon them. 
According to the National Response Framework (NRF), civil authorities must 
first exhaust all other options for resources at the local, state, and federal level before 
requesting resources from the DOD. The federal military resources must be formally 
requested through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It is important 
to note that civil authorities do not request specific types of military units, but rather a 
certain type of capability; the military then decides which services and units have that 
capability to be used to provide the requested support. The Army has modeled its 
approach to DSCA after the NRF and the National Preparedness Doctrine (NPD), as 
outlined in Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD8). The NPD calls for an ‘all-of-nation 
approach’ to incident management, with the purpose of saving lives, alleviating suffering, 
and protecting property foremost in all aspects of a disaster response. Rather than a top-
down approach, the NRF calls for a bottom up approach in responding to disasters. This 
means that civil authorities at the local level take the lead, with all higher levels providing 
support to the local Incident Commander (IC). The Army provides DSCA as a part of this 
tiered response, when local, state, and federal resources are exhausted.   
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Major disasters require rapid and effective coordination and integration between 
military forces and civil authorities. In these situations, lives can be saved or lost based 
on the effectiveness of interagency coordination and the time elapsed from a request for 
resources to resources arriving at the incident. To illustrate this, two cases will be 
examined. First, the military response to Hurricane Sandy in October 2012 will be 
addressed in detail. Second, the military’s participation in the Cascadia Rising earthquake 
response exercise in June 2016 will be addressed. These cases are different in that one is 
a real-world response, while the other is an exercise. One is on the east coast, the other is 
on the west coast. One is a hurricane response, the other is an earthquake response. These 
cases are also similar in that they included active duty, reserve, and National Guard 
forces integrating with civil authorities across multiple states and jurisdictions. From 
examination of these cases, several shortfalls or gaps in the Army’s DSCA responses 
come to light.   
The most significant gap is a lack of education or knowledge of DSCA within the 
ranks of the Army. Many leaders receive training, but the majority of the soldiers on the 
ground responding to an incident have little knowledge of DSCA in any form. The next 
gap is ineffective liaison and integration between the Army and civilian agencies prior to 
and during the initial response phase of a major disaster. This includes building 
relationships with federal, state, and local agencies, integrating DSCA into civilian 
emergency response plans, and integrating Army forces into civilian structures rapidly 
during an emergency response. The last gap is a shortfall in integration of planning 
between military and civilian agencies prior to an event, including anticipation of needs 
following a catastrophic disaster. When the Army responds, the soldiers are un-trained to 
conduct their mission, know nothing about the civilian agencies with which they will 
work, and have not been integrated into any civilian emergency response plans. The job 
gets done—that’s what the Army does—but it could be so much more effective.   
There is one potential solution that could solve all of the problems listed; the 
creation of a new functional area within the Army with a sole focus on the Army’s DSCA 
mission. The Army currently has 28 branches and 15 functional areas within its force 
structure. There are currently no branches or functional areas with a DSCA or Homeland 
 xxiv 
Security mission. In reality, the only certification a soldier can gain in DSCA is a 
voluntary Personnel Development Skill Identifier (PDSI), D7A–DSCA Specialist. This 
PDSI is gained by completing seven hours of Distance Learning (DL) training and 
attending a three-and-a-half-day course, which is taught by personnel from the National 
Guard Bureau (NGB), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and Army 
North (ARNORTH). The purpose of the DSCA Corps would be to bridge the gap 
between civil authorities and military forces before, during, and after a catastrophic 
disaster within the U.S. and its territories. The DSCA Corps fills this gap by providing 
force structure and a corps of subject matter experts who can develop and maintain 
relationships with civil authorities, facilitate the rapid deployment of Army units to 
support disaster response operations, and provide expert command and control of Army 
and joint forces during disaster response operations.   
The Army and DOD have made efforts since Hurricane Katrina to correct many 
shortfalls and gaps that have been identified in after action reports (AARs). Various 
entities throughout the Army, especially in the National Guard, have made efforts to 
improve integration and coordination between military and civilian agencies. Most of 
these efforts have been at the federal level between USNORTHCOM, ARNORTH, NGB, 
and partnering civilian agencies such as FEMA and the Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI). These efforts have had limited success in correcting the functional shortfalls 
experienced during real-world disaster response situations. A major change is needed to 
correct these problems once and for all.   
The creation of a DSCA functional area within the Army would provide a set of 
units filled with DSCA specialists who can be the lead element in the Army for all DSCA 
missions. These units would be responsible for conducting liaison and relationship 
building with civilian agencies at every level of government, from federal to local. They 
would integrate into the planning processes for civilian agencies with the goal of 
anticipating their needs and facilitating the rapid deployment of Title 32 and Title 10 
forces during a disaster. These soldiers would also serve as key facilitators of 
communication between civilian agencies and traditional Army formations, ensuring 
cohesive and integrated operations during any disaster response.   
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The DSCA Corps concept needs to be implemented immediately within the 
Army. In spite of the budgetary restrictions the Army currently faces and the challenges 
presented by this change, our responsibility as soldiers and Americans is to do all we can 
to provide life-saving assistance to civilians during their time of greatest need. Failing to 
do everything in our power to ensure we can be readily and rapidly deployed where and 
when we are needed is counter to the Army values and our mission to defend the United 
States against all enemies, both foreign and domestic.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S. Army forces have 
responded to several disasters within the United States, such as Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Sandy. These responses require rapid integration of agencies at the local, state, 
and federal level in order to save lives, minimize damage to property, and help 
communities recover. In most cases, emergencies are handled by civil authorities; 
however, when civil resources are exhausted the military is called in to provide the 
necessary support to complete the disaster response operation. The military, which 
includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, supports civil authorities by 
providing resources, but are never the lead agency for a response within the U.S.   
The system that facilitates DOD support of civil authorities during homeland 
security emergencies requires that local, state, and federal civilian resources be exhausted 
or in danger of exhaustion before DOD support can be provided. This system and its 
authorities are outlined in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (Stafford Act), enacted into federal law in 1988 as an amendment to the 
existing Disaster Relief Act of 1974. DSCA is the method by which DOD provides 
federal military support to civilian authorities during homeland emergencies. Joint 
Publication 3-28, which governs DSCA within the DOD, states, “DOD resources are 
provided only when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of 
local, state, and federal civil authorities, and when they are requested by a federal agency 
with lead responsibility and approved by SecDef.”1   
Historically, this has worked well in most cases. The Army has successfully 
provided support to civil authorities since the founding of the U.S. in 1776, but in recent 
years the support has run into problems. Since 9/11, American engagement in wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan stretched the Army and its soldiers to their limits. While the Army 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-28: Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” Department 
of Defense, Washington D.C., July 31, 2013, viii-ix.  
 2 
struggled to maintain a combat-ready force, training for DSCA missions faced neglect 
over the past decade. Consequently, an integration problem developed that became 
apparent in the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. National Guard forces in the 
affected states were largely deployed overseas when the hurricane struck. Active Army 
forces from all over the U.S., most of which had recently returned from combat rotations, 
were sent to provide DSCA. Their lack of training in this important mission was never 
more obvious than when Lieutenant General Russel Honore, the Task Force Commander, 
went on television stating that the Army was in control of operations in New Orleans.2  
Army forces attempted to conduct DSCA in the same manner they would combat 
operations against enemy forces. Conducting operations within the U.S. independent 
from direction by civil authorities is a violation of Federal Law and the laws in most 
states. Honore’s statements gave the impression that the military was in command of the 
hurricane response efforts, rather than providing resources to support the civilian 
emergency management command structure. In DSCA, unlike conventional operations, 
the military does not direct operations or control territory; it must only serve in a 
supporting role. 
The response to 9/11 also highlighted a number of issues with interagency 
coordination and integration during disasters, especially related to command and control, 
planning, and communications. The NRF, which replaced the National Response Plan 
(NRP) in 2008, was designed and implemented to correct these problems. Since then civil 
authorities have pushed hard to implement the components of the NRF, including the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System 
(ICS). These systems have vastly improved the ability of civil authorities to plan for and 
respond to disasters effectively. The Army has incorporated these systems into its DSCA 
policy in an effort to improve DSCA’s effectiveness, but training on these systems within 
the Army is virtually nonexistent. This presents problems; when soldiers arrive at an 
incident, they do not understand the systems, processes, and authorities governing 
incident response or the Army’s role in the same.   
                                                 
2 James A. Wombwell, “Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster,” The Long War Series, 
Occasional Paper 29, United States Army Combined Arms Center, 2009, 157. 
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The problem lies with the Army; it has both a lack of understanding of the civil 
response structures and processes and also a tendency to take charge of operations rather 
than deferring to the civil authorities. In order to save lives and mitigate property damage, 
it is important for multiple agencies to rapidly integrate and cooperate to respond to 
disasters. The Army needs to find a way to improve its ability to integrate with civil 
authorities rapidly and effectively in order to make a positive impact on disaster response 
operations rather than taking away from them. Therefore, this thesis researches the 
current conditions and offers strategies of improvement. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
1. How can Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) coordination and 
integration between military and civilian agencies be improved?  
2. How would the creation of a Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) 
functional area within the U.S. Army improve the way the Army provides 
DSCA? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Overview 
This thesis focuses on publications dated after 9/11 for two reasons. First, 
scholarship on these subjects is minimal prior to 9/11; the attacks on the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon highlighted a void in policy and academic writings, forcing an 
examination of existing policies on interagency coordination and therefore, more 
literature. Second, publications prior to 9/11 hold little relevance to the current global 
environment. The homeland security landscape changed radically after 9/11 with the new 
threat of global terrorism and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS); DSCA policy and doctrine had to follow suit. This analysis will increase the 
relevance of this thesis so it can be used to improve the way the Army conducts DSCA. 
This literature review is separated into two primary categories. The first category 
describes doctrine for DSCA at the DOD level, covering all branches of the Armed 
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Forces. The second discusses DSCA solely within the Army, to include the active 
component, Army Reserve and Army National Guard.   
2. DSCA and the DOD 
A review of DSCA literature requires an understanding of the doctrine that 
governs DSCA within the DOD. First, there are two relevant DOD Directives (DODDs). 
DODD 5111.13, published in 2009, updated policy related to the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) and 
DODD 3025.18, published in 2010, established the current policy for DSCA within the 
DOD.3  These documents together updated and modernized existing DOD policy for 
DSCA and for the oversight of DSCA policy within the DOD. Next, there are two DOD 
Instructions (DODIs) that provide detail on specific portions of the DSCA policy outlined 
in DODD 3025.18. The first is Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3025.16, 
which was published in 2011 and details the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer 
(EPLO) program within the DOD. The EPLO program puts active military personnel into 
liaison roles with other federal agencies like DHS and FEMA.4  The second, published in 
2013, is DODI 3025.22, which defines the use of the National Guard for DSCA 
operations.5  This instruction reflects a new view on the National Guard as an operational 
force, rather than a strategic reserve. Finally, there are DOD Manuals (DODMs), which 
provide specific guidelines for executing operations. The DODM covering DSCA is 
DODM 3025.01, which is divided into three volumes, all of which were updated in 2016 
to reflect current policy guidance and incorporate lessons learned from previous 
                                                 
3 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Directive 5111.13: Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)),” Department of Defense, 
Washington D.C., January 16, 2009, 1.  Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Directive 
3025.18: Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 
December 29, 2010, 3-6.  
4 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Instruction 3025.16: Defense Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Programs,” Department of Defense, Washington D.C., September 8, 
2011, 4-6.  
5 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Instruction 3025.22: The Use of the National Guard 
for Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” Department of Defense, Washington D.C., July 26, 2013, 2-4.  
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operations.6  DODM 3025.01 is the basis for nearly all subordinate DSCA policies and 
regulations within the DOD.   
In recent years, the DOD has strongly pursued the incorporation of Joint 
Operations into all of its doctrine and publications. Joint publications (JPs) differ from 
DOD publications mainly in their target audience. DOD publications are aimed at the 
operations of the DOD itself and administrative policies to govern all service 
components. JPs are oriented on actions taken by each service component when operating 
in a joint environment. There are three JPs that are relevant to the study of DSCA. First 
and foremost is JP 3-28, published in 2013, which “sets forth joint doctrine to govern the 
activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in DSCA operations, 
and […] the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination during DSCA operations.”7  
Second is JP 3–41, covering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-
Yield Explosive (CBRNE) consequence management within the DOD. A large portion of 
the DOD’s DSCA mission is related to CBRNE consequence management, especially 
within the National Guard.8  Finally, JP 3–08 provides guidance for interagency 
coordination during joint operations; it is written to include interactions with foreign 
governments, different service components within the DOD, and civil authorities within 
the U.S. These guidelines are the basis for DOD’s conduct of DSCA operations.9  All 
Army DSCA publications must adhere to the policies and doctrine outlined in these DOD 
and Joint publications.   
In order to set the direction of the DOD, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 
establishes long-range strategies for different lines of effort within the DOD, one of 
which is DSCA and Homeland Defense (HD). The current strategy document, entitled 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, was published 
                                                 
6 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Manual 3025.01, Volume 1: Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities: Overview,” Department of Defense, Washington D.C., August 11, 2016, 8-10.  
7 Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-28: Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” Department 
of Defense, Washington D.C., July 31, 2013, vii-xi.  
8 Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-41: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
Consequence Management,” Department of Defense, Washington D.C., June 21, 2012, vii-xii.  
9 Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-08: Interorganizational Coordination during Joint 
Operations,” Department of Defense, Washington D.C., June 24, 2011, ix-xvi.  
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in 2013 to cover the years 2012 through 2020. A large part of this document is devoted to 
current and projected future fiscal constraints facing the DOD and how the SecDef 
intends to accomplish the DOD’s missions under those constraints. Of note, the current 
strategy document is the first in this series to address the DOD’s response to complex 
catastrophes. Inclusion of this in the DOD’s primary strategy document reflects the 
SecDef’s stance on improving DSCA policy to make the DOD more responsive.10   
In order to provide support to operations throughout the world, the DOD has 
divided the planet into Geographical Combatant Commands (GCCs). The GCC 
responsible for DSCA is USNORTHCOM, which has developed a series of Contingency 
Plans (CONPLANs) that are designed to be taken ‘off the shelf’ when an incident occurs 
to facilitate rapid planning and deployment of forces. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 
3501–08, the current version of which was published in 2008, directs specific actions that 
will be taken immediately and over time by each of the service component commands 
within the U.S. in the event the military is requested to support a civilian disaster 
response.11 This CONPLAN was updated following Hurricane Katrina and again 
following Hurricane Sandy to incorporate lessons learned from each of these major 
events.     
Following a thorough review of DOD publications related to DSCA, it is 
appropriate to review some documents that provide a deeper insight into DOD’s DSCA 
operations. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an arm of the U.S. 
Congress that performs in-depth investigations of federal programs to determine if they 
are spending money responsibly and meeting the intent for which they were conceived 
and created. Related to DSCA, there are two categories of reports; Civil Support (an older 
term for DSCA) and Homeland Defense. Three recent Civil Support reports that stand out 
in this literature review are as follows. GAO-13-763 reports on actions needed to improve 
                                                 
10 Department of Defense, “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities,” Department of Defense, Washington D.C., February 25, 2013, 1-3.  
11 United States Northern Command, “USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08: Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities (DSCA),” Department of Defense, Washington D.C., May 16, 2008, v-xii.  
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DOD’s planning for complex catastrophes.12 As previously stated, the current DOD 
DSCA strategy document, published around the same time as this GAO report, is the first 
to address complex catastrophes in any real way. This shows a possible correlation 
between recommendations in GAO reports and policy modifications within the DOD.   
GAO-15-686T reports on actions the DOD has taken to strengthen its support to civil 
authorities. This report is a follow-up document designed to determine if faults found 
during an initial investigation (called an audit) have been corrected or not.13  It is evident 
by the recent publication dates of most of DOD’s DSCA publications that steps have 
been and are being taken to make the DOD more effective at providing support to civil 
authorities. Published very recently, GAO-16-332 addresses the need for DOD to clarify 
its DSCA roles during cyber incidents. As an emerging threat to homeland security, 
cyber-attack is being addressed by the DOD, but current DSCA publications do not 
address this threat as a stand-alone threat outside of a standard information technology 
threat.14   
On the other side, there are two recent Homeland Defense reports from GAO that 
are worth mentioning in this review. GAO-10-386 addresses the DOD’s failure to 
identify resources and capabilities that can support civil authorities during disaster 
response operations. While listed under the HD category, this report has a decidedly 
DSCA bent to it. The chief assertion of this report is that the DOD needs to make it easier 
or simpler for civil authorities to request military resources by categorizing military 
capabilities into the same Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) civilian emergency 
managers use to categorize resources.15  GAO-13-128 addresses gaps in DOD guidance 
                                                 
12 Government Accountability Office, “GAO-13-763: Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve 
DOD’s Planning for a Complex Catastrophe,” Government Accountability Office, Washington D.C., 
September 2013, 1-5.  
13 Government Accountability Office, “GAO-15-686T: Civil Support: DOD Is Taking Action to 
Strengthen Support to Civil Authorities,” Government Accountability Office, Washington D.C., June 10, 
2015, 1-3.  
14 Government Accountability Office, “GAO-16-332: Civil Support: DOD Needs to Clarify Its Roles 
and Responsibilities for Defense Support of Civil Authorities During Cyber Incidents,” Government 
Accountability Office, Washington D.C., April 2016, 1-4.  
15 Government Accountability Office, “GAO-10-386: Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts 
to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities During Disasters,” Government Accountability Office, 
Washington D.C., May 16, 2013, 1-4.  
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for HD and DSCA operations.16  These GAO audit reports indicate the DOD is making 
progress in improving DSCA capabilities, but not to the degree recommended by GAO. 
This shows that the DOD is committed to improving its ability to effectively conduct 
DSCA, but that DSCA remains low in the DOD’s list of priorities.   
Official documents aside, much has been written by students at military schools 
such as the United States Army War College, the United States Army Command and 
General Staff College, and the Naval Postgraduate School on the subject of DSCA. To 
begin, a book written by Bert B. Tussing and Robert McCreight provides an overview of 
the concepts and policies related to HD and DSCA. This book’s main focus is the 
military’s role as a supporting agency during DSCA operations, while it is the lead 
federal agency for HD operations.17  This is an important and relevant piece of literature 
as it points to the main issue of integration between DOD forces and civil authorities and 
the fact that the DOD is never in the lead role during DSCA operations. Another 
important document is a Congressional report written by Alice R. Buchalter, which 
provides a synopsis of current DOD policy for DSCA and how it ties in to current 
homeland security doctrine. A main focus of this report is the request process used by the 
DOD to provide resources to civil authorities.18  Delving further into the request process, 
a thesis co-written by Charles W. Dunphy, Jr. and Christophe Radel examines request 
processes at the local, state, and federal levels and how they tie in to the DOD’s process 
for providing resources. Their key assertion is, “the exact role of the Defense Department 
[…] remains misunderstood by a number of key individuals and organizations.”19  This 
lack of understanding of roles and responsibilities is a common thread in the literature. 
Beyond these theses and documents, the remaining literature revolves around 
                                                 
16 Government Accountability Office, “GAO-13-128: Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address 
Gaps in Homeland Defense and Civil Support Guidance,” Government Accountability Office, Washington 
D.C., October 2012, 1-3.  
17 Bert B. Tussing and Robert McCreight, Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities (DSCA): The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and Defend, 1st ed., CRC Press, 2014, 1. 
18 Alice R. Buchalter, “Military Support to Civil Authorities: The Role of the Department of Defense 
in Support of Homeland Defense,” The Library of Congress, Washington D.C., February 2007, 1-3.  
19 Charles W. Dunphy, Jr. and Christophe Radel, “Assessment of Local, State and Federal Request 
Processes for Defense Support of Civil Authorities in the United States,” MBA Professional Report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009, v.  
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recommendations to improve various problems with DOD’s DSCA processes and 
capabilities. This is important because confusion over roles and responsibilities can lead 
to inefficient response as noted during post-Katrina response efforts.   
Two theses investigate unity of command between Title 10 (federal) forces and 
Title 32 (state) forces. The first, written by John H. Ebbighausen, focuses on legal 
authorities for the different types of forces. Ebbighausen’s conclusion is that the National 
Guard (Title 32) should have the lead role during DSCA operations because it “is well 
integrated with local and state emergency management authorities.”20 The second, 
written by Caroline R. Prosch, uses case studies from Florida and Israel to examine which 
force should have the lead role during DSCA. While Prosch provides no specific 
recommendation as Ebbighausen does, she recommends further action be taken to make 
such a determination.21   
Similar to these theses, there are two others that examine the issues between DOD 
forces and civil authorities and who has the lead role. Tony S. Lombardo wrote in 2007 
that the relationship between DOD forces and civil authorities used to be strong, but has 
recently suffered a lapse. He asserts, “Changes to disaster statutes, doctrine, and 
authoritative policies along with a contentious debate over the DoDs role in the domestic 
disaster arena have aided in deteriorating their relationship.”22  He suggests that this poor 
relationship contributed to the DOD’s slow response during Hurricane Katrina.23  Juliana 
M. Walker furthers this discussion by examining the issues in determining the lead 
federal agency during the Hurricane Katrina response. In her 2006 thesis, she states, 
“Many concerned with the federal response to Katrina believed that America’s homeland 
security system could not aptly respond to a large-scale natural or man-made catastrophe 
                                                 
20 John H. Ebbighausen, “Unity of Command for Homeland Security: Title 32, Title 10, or a 
Combination,” Master’s Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2006, iii.  
21 Caroline R. Prosch, “Getting to One from Title 10 + Title 32: Unity of Effort in the Homeland,” 
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011, 1-3.  
22 Tony S. Lombardo, “Collaboration or Control?: The Struggle for Power in Catastrophic Disaster 
Response,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007, v.  
23 Ibid., 1-4.  
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without the military in a lead role.”24  Federal laws and policies dictate that the DOD is 
always in a supporting role during DSCA.25  The fallback here is the U.S. Constitution, 
which places civil authorities over military forces at all times except during combat 
operations in defense of the U.S. or its allies. This is where the difference between HD 
and DSCA is important. The only exception to this in federal law is the Insurrection Act 
of 1807, which allows the President of the U.S. to deploy federal forces within the U.S. to 
put down lawlessness, insurrection, and rebellion when state National Guard forces are 
unable to handle the problem. The Insurrection Act was used by President Abraham 
Lincoln to commence the American Civil War.   
There are several academic works that recommend changes to DSCA policies. In 
a 2012 thesis, Michael Bentley writes that there are several impediments to efficient 
DOD support to civil authorities. He recommends two changes, “amend the Posse 
Comitatus (PCA), and allow federal forces to serve in a tactical control (TACON) 
relationship under the governor of a state while supporting civil support operations inside 
of the United States.”26  It makes sense for the governor to control military operations 
within their state to ensure all military forces follow the laws of the land, which differ 
widely from state to state. Another author also recommends changes to the PCA. Ray A. 
Zuniga focuses his entire 2009 thesis on the PCA and the barriers it poses to effective 
DSCA operations. He goes further than Bentley, however, stating, “The Posse Comitatus 
Act (PCA) needs to be repealed and a new Interagency Coordination Act needs to put in 
its place.”27  Another issue is with interagency coordination, which is examined in depth 
by Derek Wessman in his 2007 thesis. He discusses in depth the failure of coordination 
during the Hurricane Katrina response and what has been done since then to improve 
coordination between federal agencies. He recommends the formation of a standing joint 
                                                 
24 Juliana M. Walker, “The Military and Domestic Disaster Response: Lead Role Revealed through 
the Eye of Hurricane Katrina?,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006, v.  
25 Ibid., 1-3.  
26 Michael Bentley, “The Role of Military Forces in Disaster Response: Remove the Impediments,” 
Master’s Thesis, United States Army War College, 2012, 29.  
27 Ray A. Zuniga, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Hindrance to National Security in Need of a Change,” 
Research Report, United States Air Force Command and Staff College, 2009, 1.  
 11 
task force (JTF), used solely for DSCA missions, rather than using existing combat 
units.28  In a supporting thesis, written in 2006, Jason T. Garkey identifies four issues 
that need to be corrected.   
1) better integration between existing state National Guard (NG) and 
Active Component (AC) command and control systems, 2) development 
of an aggressive NRP and NIMS education program within units stationed 
in the USNORTHCOM and [United States Pacific Command] USPACOM 
[Area of Responsibility] AOR, 3) USNORTHCOM develops a domestic 
exercises branch to provide exercise support across the interagency arena 
for DOD support to the [Lead Federal Agency] LFA, and 4) developing an 
aggressive public information response cell to assist the LFA during the 
initial phases of federal support.29   
This literature collectively recommends major changes in DOD policy related to DSCA, 
but it does not get to the core of the issues with DOD forces integrating with civilian 
agencies during DSCA missions.   
Beyond the literature that recommends specific changes to policies within the 
DOD, there are several documents that discuss general improvements that can be made to 
existing policy. These more moderate changes are aimed at correcting deficiencies in 
current policy, rather than changing policy entirely. This makes them more useful 
because they are more likely to be implemented as the DOD continuously adjusts its 
policies over time. The first of these is a thesis written by Thomas J. Langowski in 2008, 
in which he argues the DOD needs to put more of an emphasis on DSCA as a primary 
mission. In his thesis, he states, “DOD should view DSCA as a core mission and, 
irrespective of the current military operational tempo, they must seasonally source forces, 
for planning purposes, to satisfy the most likely DSCA response.”30  In a different vein, a 
thesis written by Eric L. Leshinsky in 2006 focuses specifically on the DOD’s Immediate 
                                                 
28 Derek Wessman, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities: Critical Capability or Vulnerability? 
Optimizing DOD’s Domestic Range of Military Operations,” Manuscript, United States Naval War 
College, 2007, 5-6.  
29 Jason T. Garkey, “In Support of the Common Domestic Defense: Unity of Command between 
Federal and State Controlled Military Forces,” Master’s Thesis, United States Naval War College, 2006, 
10.  
30 Thomas J. Langowski, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” Monograph, United States Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2008, 3.  
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Response Authority (IRA), which gives federal forces the authority to respond to 
emergencies without authorization if they occur near a federal military installation. 
Leshinsky states, “The research identifies current barriers to the IRA provision’s 
effectiveness, such as strategic guidance, oversight, and training, and also provides 
recommendations to help eliminate these barriers to eventually improve the overall 
effectiveness of this valuable resource for city, state, and federal first responders.”31  
Another thesis, written in 2008 by Rodney Liberato, has a different take on the issues 
with DSCA. He uses vignettes from the National Planning Scenarios to show that the 
DOD’s validation and approval process for DSCA missions is hampered by current DOD 
policy and regulation. He recommends using existing DOD expeditionary force structures 
as DSCA response forces.32  Finally, a 2015 report authored by a group at the RAND 
Corporation discusses how the DOD can better support FEMA’s All-Hazards Plan. By 
preparing to fill identified shortfalls in civilian response agencies, the DOD could 
improve its responsiveness when called on for support.33   
There is some literature that delves more deeply into different aspects of the 
DSCA problem. First is a thesis written by Robert B. Gaston, wherein he proposes 
adapting current processes for battle staff into the DSCA mission-set. He says, “To 
preclude repeating frequent failures in timeliness, preparation and coordination a standard 
framework must be developed to synchronize existing and evolving processes and 
capabilities.”34  Another example is the thesis written by William W. Johnson where he 
recommends the formation of an active component rapid response force, which “will be 
trained and equipped to respond to an incident of national significance characteristic of 
                                                 
31 Eric L. Leshinsky, “Prepared for Disaster?  Improving the Department of Defense’s Immediate 
Response Authority,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006, v.  
32 Rodney Liberato, “A New Department of Defense Framework for Efficient Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007, 1-3.  
33 Michael J. McNerney et al., Improving DOD Support to FEMA’s All-Hazards Plans, RAND 
Corporation, 2015, 1-4.  
34 Robert B. Gaston, “Standardizing Readiness and Response in Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities,” Master’s Thesis, United States Army War College, 2011, 1.  
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those most prevalent within the specific region of action.”35  In an attempt to correct 
issues with command and control during DSCA missions following Hurricane Katrina, 
the DOD created the Dual Status Command (DSC) program wherein a single military 
commander can control both Title 10 and Title 32 forces. The DSC is examined in depth 
and through the lens of continuous process improvement in a paper written by Ryan 
Burke and Sue McNeil. In this document, the authors examine the issues present during 
Hurricane Katrina and compare them to the issues faced during Hurricane Sandy.36 This 
is an important comparison because their research illustrates how DOD’s policy changes 
following Hurricane Katrina were then implemented and tested during Hurricane Sandy. 
In general, research showed improvements in response times of DOD forces though 
advanced deployment and coordination between Title 10 and Title 32 commands through 
the use of the DSC.   
The DSCA literature also highly stresses the need for better education and 
training for military personnel on the range of DSCA missions. A thesis that deals solely 
with the issue of training officers for interagency positions was written by Clifford A. 
Nancarrow. He proposes the establishment of a “Homeland Defense College and suggests 
that military officers be awarded credit for joint tours through service with non-DOD 
agencies.”37  By making it easier for military personnel to receive training and 
experience in DSCA and emergency management subjects, the DOD can improve its 
ability to respond to requests for support. In this same vein is a paper written by a group 
from the U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, led by Bert B. Tussing, 
which investigates ways the reserve component could be leveraged to improve the 
DOD’s DSCA responsiveness. This paper shows that the reserves are dispersed 
throughout the states and are better positioned to directly support civil authorities without 
                                                 
35 William W. Johnson, “Active Component Rapid Response Force: The Answer to the Military’s 
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Significance?,” Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2007, iii.  
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War College, 2015, ix-x.  
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the long response times of active component units stationed only at federal 
installations.38   
To conclude this section is an examination of two additional documents that focus 
attention on USNORTHCOM specifically. First is an overview of USNORTHCOM and 
its mission as the lead DOD command for DSCA operations, written by a group of 
professors from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. In this document, 
the authors examine the missions required of USNORTHCOM and its ability to conduct 
those missions. They also look at past failures, especially during Hurricane Katrina, and 
what has been done to fix them.39  In his thesis, Steven Osterholzer focuses on the issue 
of a lack of education of critical stakeholders contributing to USNORTHCOM’s 
ineffectiveness. He proposes that USNORTHCOM make an effort to conduct education 
and outreach for its critical stakeholders before the DOD is needed for a real 
emergency.40   
Having examined the many facets of literature related to DSCA and the DOD as a 
whole, the gaps in the literature begin to become apparent. First, there is a significant lack 
of academic literature on this subject outside of the military service schools. The vast 
majority of the literature is policy, regulation, doctrine, and the professional writings of 
military officers. This shows a gap in perspective, with the customer (i.e., civilian agency 
partners, law enforcement officers, emergency management professionals, etc.) missing 
from the conversation to a large extent. Second, there is a great deal of difference 
between publishing doctrine and policy and actually implementing it within the DOD. 
Personal experience tells me that these subjects are not regularly taught or addressed 
within the Army. Overall, the military often lacks an understanding of its role with regard 
to emergency response down at the lowest level. It is important to separate the Army’s 
                                                 
38 Bert B. Tussing, James F. Roth, and Richard W. Dillon, “Improving the Military’s Domestic Crisis 
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39 United States Army Command and General Staff College, An Examination of USNORTHCOM’s 
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Leavenworth, KS, 2014, 1-3.  
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role in DSCA from the other services as it is the defense institution used most frequently 
to respond and therefore, needs to be trained to deal with the issues. The next section of 
this literature review will show policy and scholarship on the Army specifically and its 
role in DSCA, including the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard and their 
special roles.   
3. DSCA and the United States Army 
In this section, the focus is on Army-specific literature as it is related to DSCA. 
The chief among these is Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-28, which provides an 
overview of the Army’s role in DSCA. This publication focuses on the operational force 
within the active Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard.41  As a supplement to ADP 
3-28, the Army has also published Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-28, 
which goes into greater depth on how Army units conduct DSCA.42  Both of these 
documents support the doctrine outlined in DOD policies and regulations.   
There are other regulations and policies closely related to these, but they do not 
provide any additional information pertinent to the general DSCA literature review. 
Relative to the number of regulations for Army combat operations, there are extremely 
few for DSCA. For this reason, some commands within the Army have produced various 
handbooks to augment existing regulations and provide more useful information for 
commanders in the field. One such handbook is entitled, How the Army Runs: A Senior 
Leader Reference Handbook, and was produced by the Army War College. This 
handbook covers a wide range of topics, but it devotes an entire chapter to DSCA; this is 
a major departure from handbooks produced in the decade following 9/11, which were 
focused entirely on overseas operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and needless to say was 
not adequate for covering issues such as hurricanes.43   
                                                 
41 Department of the Army, “Army Doctrine Publication 3-28: Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” 
Department of the Army, Washington D.C., July 2012, 3-5.  
42 Department of the Army, “Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-28: Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities,” Department of the Army, Washington D.C., June 2013, iv-v.  
43 United States Army War College, “How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 
2011-2012,” United States Army War College, December 2011, 499-509.  
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As is the case for official publications, the additional literature on the Army and 
its role in DSCA is relatively thin. Roughly half of the literature discusses the Army’s 
role in DSCA generally with few specifics. First among these is a RAND Corporation 
report written by Eric Larson and John Peters (2001) entitled, Preparing the U.S. Army 
for Homeland Security. This report addresses the national security strategy and homeland 
security strategy following the 9/11 attacks and how these strategy documents impact the 
Army.44  Another RAND Corporation report, written by John Y. Schrader, examines the 
Army’s role in natural disaster support. This report is somewhat dated, but includes a 
great deal of foundational information on the Army’s DSCA response plans; it just leaves 
out a lot about terrorist attacks and instead focuses on natural disasters.45  Yet another 
RAND Corporation report, written by Jeremy Shapiro, examines how the Army can 
maintain its readiness for DSCA missions while engaged in wars in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This report is important in that it attempts to balance competing 
requirements. The issues identified became a reality during Hurricane Katrina when the 
majority of the DOD forces that could have responded quickly to the disaster were 
overseas fighting in Iraq at that time.46  To expand on this document, the United States 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute commissioned a report, written by Antulio 
Echevarria II, to examine the strategic implications of DSCA on the Army’s future 
strategy. Echevarria believes the Army can maintain its current engagements in Iraq and 
Afghanistan while still meeting DSCA requirements by considering alternative force 
structures to make the Army more modular. This would mean smaller, more versatile and 
self-sustainable units.47   
Furthering the review of the Army and DSCA is a thesis written by Terry 
Ethridge that examines the updated National Security Strategy’s impact on the Army by 
                                                 
44 Eric Larson and John Peters, Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, 
and Options, RAND Corporation, 2001, 1-2.  
45 John Y. Schrader, The Army’s Role in Domestic Disaster Support, RAND Corporation, 1993, 1-3.  
46 Jeremy Shapiro, The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy, Edited by Lynn E. Davis, 
RAND Corporation, 2003, 1-2.  
47 Antulio Echevarria II, “The Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective,” United States 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2001, 1-5.  
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providing “an explanation of the interrelation between the two strategies and the 
military’s roles in these strategies.”48  Further, Terrence K. Kelly writes in his thesis that 
the Army’s sole focus on overseas combat operations has reduced the Army’s ability to 
support DSCA operations. He cites the preamble to the U.S. Constitution as a foundation 
for a presumed focus on domestic security and support to the citizens of the United 
States.49  Richard C. Townes further supports this argument with his thesis, where he 
argues that HD and DSCA need to be the Army’s primary mission, rather than wars 
overseas. He holds the viewpoint that protecting the homeland can be done better from 
the homeland, rather than taking the fight to other countries and depleting out own 
resources.50   
The RAND Corporation provides additional literature to support the Army’s 
DSCA role. Two documents authored by RAND teams, with Lynn E. Davis as the lead 
author of both, are relevant. The first report, Army Forces in Homeland Security, looks at 
how the Army can better prepare its resources for use in DSCA missions by identifying 
existing shortfalls in the civilian infrastructure: “They conclude that the nation needs to 
decide whether to bear the costs today in order to hedge against future risks.”51  The 
second report specifically looks at the Army’s response to Hurricane Katrina and what 
can be done to improve such a response in the future. The report identifies several areas 
for the active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard to improve responsiveness 
and ability to respond.52  The use of the reserve component has been mentioned before, 
and was a key to the response to Hurricane Katrina. Two papers were written discussing 
how the Army Reserve in particular can be better utilized during DSCA operations. The 
first, written by Edwin C. Domingo, looks at ways “the U.S. Army Reserve can leverage 
                                                 
48 Terry Ethridge, “Homeland Security and Defense: The One Army Approach,” Research Project, 
United States Army War College, 2006, 1.  
49 Terrence K. Kelly, “Transformation and Homeland Security: Dual Challenges for the US Army,” 
Parameters, 2003, 36-37.  
50 Richard C. Townes, “The U.S. Army’s Role in Homeland Security: What Changes Are Needed?,” 
Research Project, United States Army War College, 2002, 1.  
51 Lynn E. Davis et al., Army Forces for Homeland Security, RAND Corporation, 2004, 1.  
52 Lynn E. Davis et al., Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, RAND 
Corporation, 2007, 1-3.  
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its force structure and core competencies with local, state, and federal governments to 
support consequence management operations and enhance Homeland Security.”53  The 
Reserve is spread out in areas other than federal installations, meaning it is postured to 
support civil authorities more quickly. The second, written by James K. Rowsey, is in the 
same vein. He looks at the Army Reserve as a solution to a fiscally constrained Army, 
and concludes that the Reserve has the ability to support DSCA missions without the 
funds required for the active Army; the reserves only require full funding when 
activated.54   
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) produces a periodic newsletter 
entitled, Civil Support and the U.S. Army which began publication in 2009. CALL’s 
mission is to share current lessons learned from various Army operations all over the 
world with the rest of the Army in the hope that this information will continuously 
improve operations. The Civil Support newsletter is CALL’s DSCA arm. In its inaugural 
issue, the newsletter asserts, “the ‘homeland battlefield’ could be a coastal city hit by a 
catastrophic hurricane, a location on the U.S. border, a container and shipyard, a street 
riot in major city, a championship-level football game, a bridge collapse, or even a 
political party’s convention.”55  This speaks to the growing understanding of DSCA and 
how the Army can better support civil authorities.   
Two final documents related to the Army and DSCA are also important to include 
in this review. The first is a thesis written by Jeffery M. Daigle. He suggests that the 
Army should follow suit with other services such as the Navy and Air Force in creating a 
special skill identifier or occupational specialty for DSCA and Homeland Security:  
“Additionally, a holistic analysis of the current DOD definition of Homeland Security 
demonstrates the fallacy of current Army doctrine in regards to Homeland Defense and 
                                                 
53 Edwin C. Domingo, “U.S. Army Reserve Roles: Consequence Management in Support of 
Homeland Security,” Research Project, United States Army War College, 2002, ii.  
54 James K. Rowsey, “An Examination of the Role of the United States Army Reserve in Support of 
the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” Master’s Thesis, United States Army Command and 
General Staff College, 2014, 1-2.  
55 Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Civil Support and the U.S. Army,” CALL Newsletter, no. 10–
16 (December 2009), i.  
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Defense Support of Civil Authorities.”56  Continuing with a comparison of the Army to 
other services, a document examining the Navy’s DSCA capabilities provides an 
important insight. The thesis written by Kevin McClellan provides a detailed description 
of the Navy’s doctrine and capabilities for providing DSCA. He also compares the 
Navy’s policies with other services, including the Army, which provides a different 
perspective on Army DSCA policies and operations.57   
Building on the literature covering the DOD as a whole, the Army-oriented 
literature continues to highlight a gap in perspective from civilian partners and a lack of 
understanding the application of doctrine and policy by soldiers at the lowest levels. 
What’s missing here is something within the Army to bridge the gap between the Army’s 
combat mission role and the on-call mission of DSCA. DSCA is a mission that provides 
little notice or time to prepare and requires a set of competencies on which Army 
personnel, for the most part, do not train. This creates a twofold problem. First, soldiers 
are not ready to respond quickly. Second, when they do respond, soldiers do not 
understand how to respond. They are unclear on what laws and regulations govern their 
operations, how the command and control system is structured, etc. It is essential to start 
addressing these gaps. 
4. Conclusion 
This review has covered a wide range of literature related to DSCA operations at 
both the DOD and Army levels. It attempts to show both the doctrinal basis for DSCA 
and existing scholarship on the subject. There are gaps in the literature that can be further 
explored in this thesis. The literature on the Army’s role in DSCA is very sparse, and 
most of that literature is more than 10 years old, making its relevance questionable. Also, 
much of the literature on the Army is written by RAND Corporation researchers, which 
does not diminish its value, but puts into question how much has been done in academia 
to evaluate current and ongoing issues. The DOD and the Army are slow-moving beasts 
                                                 
56 Jeffery M. Daigle, “Does the Army Need a Homeland Security Skill Identifier?,” Master’s Thesis, 
United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2011, iv.  
57 Kevin McClellan, “Are the U.S. Navy’s Current Procedures for Responding to Homeland Defense 
and Security Tasking Adequately Designed?,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 1-4.  
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when it comes to change. It is evident by a review of the existing literature that the DOD 
is making strides toward improving its doctrine based on lessons learned and 
recommendations from various levels. It is also evident from the literature that there is a 
great deal more that needs to be improved in order to make the DOD a more responsive 
and efficient engine for supporting civil authorities in their time of greatest need. The 
Army plays a large role in the DOD’s ability to conduct effective DSCA, but its role 
needs to be seriously improved.   
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Object/Sample: This thesis examines existing doctrine, policies, and 
regulations at the DOD/Joint and Army levels related to DSCA. It focuses on the Army, 
but DOD/Joint documents provide an overarching framework that is still applicable.   
2. Selection: The topic of this thesis was selected for two main reasons. First, 
the author is a soldier in the Army, so issues associated with the Army and its role are of 
particular import, in addition to an established familiarity with its doctrine, policies, and 
regulations. Second, research into this subject indicates that the Army is behind its sister 
services in its conduct of DSCA; thus marked improvements can be made within the 
Army.   
3. Limits: A study of the entirety of the DOD was beyond the scope of this 
project. Additionally, there are no comparisons made between the Army and other service 
component within the U.S. or outside it, again because it is beyond the thesis’s scope. 
Review of applicable literature is limited to current editions of documents published since 
9/11 due to many significant changes that this event brought about.  
4. Data Sources: There is minimal literature available on the subject of 
DSCA and the Army. Most information will come from doctrinal publications, 
regulations, policies, and after-action reviews. There are news and journal articles that are 
relevant as well. Available scholarly sources are used, but they represent a small part of 
the total list of sources used.   
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5. Type and Mode of Analysis: This thesis involves a policy analysis of 
Army DSCA doctrine, policy, and regulation. The process is to first understand existing 
policy, analyze its strengths and weaknesses, and then recommend changes. Bardach’s 
policy analysis method is used, which involves the following steps: Define the Problem; 
Assemble Some Evidence; Construct the Alternatives; Select the Criteria; Project the 
Outcomes; Confront the Trade-offs; Decide; Tell Your Story.58  Also, an abbreviated 
version of Yin’s case study method is applied to the two cases in Chapter III using the 
following steps: Define the case; Justify the choice of a single- or multiple-case study; 
Deliberately adopt or minimize theoretical perspectives.59   
6. Output: The final product of this thesis is a recommendation to create a 
new functional area, the DSCA Corps, within the Army. The DSCA Corps concept is 
designed to correct identified shortfalls with integration, coordination, training, and 
expertise with regard to DSCA operations.    
                                                 
58 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 4th ed., Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2012, xvi.  
59 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 5th ed., Sage Publications, 2013, 1. 
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II. DSCA IN THE U.S. ARMY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the basic structure and purpose of DSCA within the Army. It 
then details the processes for the Army to provide DSCA, from the time resources are 
requested to the time forces are on the ground responding. Using historical examples, this 
chapter will show how the Army has provided DSCA since the founding of the U.S. and 
continues to do so. This chapter also highlights the areas of Army DSCA that have been 
changed since 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina to improve DSCA. It provides a description of 
the NRF and NIMS, which govern civilian responses and were implemented post-9/11. 
Next, it covers the DSC concept, which was implemented post-Katrina. Following these 
two major changes, other points will be covered, including IRA, the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), and the FEMA request process (including 
the relationship between the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and Defense 
Coordinating Officer (DCO)). The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of 
the concept and practice of DSCA in the Army. This foundation of knowledge is 
important in order for the reader to understand the gaps addressed in subsequent chapters 
and the thesis’s core conclusions and recommendations.   
B. DEFINING DSCA 
This thesis examines the U.S. Army’s role in DSCA, which is outlined in detail in 
ADP 3-28, the Army’s DSCA manual. ADP 3-28 defines DSCA as: 
Support provided by United States Federal military forces, DOD civilians, 
DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard 
forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors 
of the States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, United 
States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil 
authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other 
domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.60 
                                                 
60 DA, “ADP 3-28,” 3.  
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There are two important points to note from this definition. First, DSCA involves 
federal military support, which means Army National Guard forces only fall under this 
definition when federalized under Title 10 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). Second, 
DSCA is conducted only when requested by civil authorities. The Army cannot decide on 
its own to conduct DSCA missions, even if there is a disaster in the immediate vicinity of 
a military installation.61  Federal law governs the conduct of DOD forces within the 
borders of the U.S. It also outlines the circumstances under which the DOD can provide 
support to civil authorities, all of which must be provided under the command and control 
of those civil authorities.   
C. LAWS GOVERNING DSCA 
Federal law, known as the U.S.C., dictates what the Army is and is not legally 
allowed to do while operating within the borders of the U.S. There are three laws in 
particular that are applicable to DSCA and are worth a brief overview. The first is the 
Stafford Act, which outlines the criteria for the President of the U.S. (POTUS) to make a 
federal disaster declaration. This federal disaster declaration is required before military 
forces can be deployed within the U.S. to conduct DSCA. The second is the Posse 
Comitatus Act (PCA), which makes it illegal to use federal military forces to conduct law 
enforcement activities within the U.S. The third is the Insurrection Act, which was 
written as an exception to the PCA and allows the POTUS to use federal military forces 
for law enforcement within the U.S. only if the expressed purpose is to quell an 
insurrection or rebellion.   
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford 
Act) governs federal disaster assistance for natural or man-made disasters throughout the 
U.S.  “The Stafford Act authorizes the President to use Federal assets to supplement State 
and local efforts and capabilities to save lives, protect property, public health, and ensure 
safety thereby alleviating damage, loss, hardship, and suffering.”62  Under the Stafford 
                                                 
61 An exception to this is the DOD’s Immediate Response Authority (IRA), which is discussed in 
detail later in this chapter.   
62 Lombardo, “Collaboration or Control,” 8.  
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Act, the President can declare federal disasters or emergencies under a number of 
different criteria, each of which has a different set of financial obligations from the 
federal government to the affected state. A Presidential disaster declaration releases 
financial and material support from FEMA and also allows the DOD to provide DSCA as 
requested by civilian agencies involved in the response efforts. It is understood that a 
Presidential disaster declaration comes after a state has declared a state-level disaster and 
has exhausted or will soon exhaust its available resources and EMAC resources.63   
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) became law in 1878, following the presidential 
election of 1876. During this highly-contested election, President Ulysses S. Grant 
unilaterally sent federal military forces to aid federal marshals in securing polling 
locations in South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida. The PCA prohibits “the use of the 
military ‘as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws.’”64  Initially, the PCA 
only applied to the Army (and the Air Force when it began as the Army Air Corps), but 
the DOD subsequently extended the PCA through regulation to apply to the Navy and 
Marine Corps as well. The PCA specifically does not apply to the Coast Guard, which 
has a peacetime domestic law enforcement mission under Title 14 of the U.S.C., or the 
National Guard when in state service; the PCA applies to the National Guard only when 
federally activated under Title 10 U.S.C.65   The PCA applies only to federal forces or 
federalized National Guard forces under Title 10 U.S.C. All active and reserve 
components of the DOD fall under Title 10 U.S.C., so the PCA applies to all DOD forces 
except the National Guard while in a state status.   
When the National Guard is activated for domestic operations, there are three 
possible statuses under which it can be activated. The first and most common is called 
State Active Duty (SAD), which is used when the National Guard is activated by the 
Governor for limited operations within the homeland. The state is responsible for the 
costs associated with SAD mobilization until or unless reimbursed by the federal 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 8-9.  
64 Matthew Carlton Hammond, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal,” 
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government. The second status is Title 32 U.S.C., which is used when National Guard 
forces are activated for national disasters as declared by the President under the Stafford 
Act. National Guard personnel are still under the control and authority of the governor of 
the state within which they are operating. The final status is Title 10 U.S.C., which is 
used for federal activation for overseas contingency operations.66  Figure 1 shows the 
distinction between the three different duty statuses under which National Guard forces 
can provide DSCA.   
Figure 1.  Comparison of Duty Statuses for National Guard Soldiers67 
The PCA applies primarily to military support to law enforcement operations and 
whether military units can carry weapons while operating in the homeland or not. 
66 Ibid., 963-968. 
67 Source: Peter A. Topp, “What Should Be the Relationship Between the National Guard and United 
States Northern Command in Civil Support Operations Following Catastrophic Events,” Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2006, 13.  
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Personnel that fall under Title 10 U.S.C. may not conduct law enforcement operations or 
support law enforcement personnel by conducting arrests, searches, or seizures. Other 
indirect support, such as manning unarmed checkpoints or conducting welfare checks are 
allowed. This means Title 10 forces may not support law enforcement operations in any 
way except to provide materiel support to law enforcement personnel (i.e., food, water, 
and shelter). In addition, Title 10 forces may not carry weapons while conducting 
domestic operations; weapons must remain stored in a secure vault at the unit’s duty 
station. If law enforcement support is needed, National Guard forces under SAD or Title 
32 may carry weapons and conduct law enforcement operations within the homeland as 
long as the governor of the state within which they are operating gives permission for the 
National Guard to do so.   
The only exception to the PCA is the Insurrection Act of 1807, which allows the 
President to use Title 10 military forces “to suppress, in any State, any insurrection, 
domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy.”68  Essentially, this means Title 
10 forces can be used conditionally to put down rebellion within the homeland.   
D. THE ARMY DSCA PROCESS 
In order for the Army to provide DSCA, civil authorities must first exhaust all 
other options for resources, then must formally request military support through FEMA. 
It is important to note that civil authorities do not request specific military assistance or 
force, but rather a mission support request; the military decides which resources to use to 
accomplish this mission. The Army is activated for DSCA missions when local, state, and 
federal civilian agencies are unable to provide needed resources which can be provided 
by the Army.   
The Army has modeled its approach to DSCA after the NRF and the NPD, as 
outlined in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8. The NPD calls for an ‘all-of-nation’ or 
‘whole community’ approach to incident management, with the purpose of saving lives, 
alleviating suffering, and protecting property foremost in all aspects of a disaster 
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response. Rather than a top-down approach, the NRF calls for a bottom up approach in 
accomplishing the NPD. This means that civil authorities at the local level take the lead, 
with all higher levels providing support to the local IC. The Army provides DSCA as a 
part of this tiered response, when local, state, and federal resources are exhausted. This 
tiered response begins at the state level with the affected state’s National Guard.   
Governors have the ability to activate their state’s National Guard during a state 
disaster declaration under one of two different duty statuses. First, they can be activated 
in a SAD status, which is fully funded by the state (i.e., no federal funding). National 
Guard forces in this status are actually categorized as state employees; they do not get the 
same benefits (insurance, housing allowance, subsistence allowance, etc.) as they would 
on federal active status, and any injuries incurred on duty are processed as Workman’s 
Compensation claims. Each state’s budgetary allocation for SAD funding differs, but 
generally states do not retain enough funding to activate their National Guard for long 
durations or major disasters. For this reason, National Guard forces can be activated 
under Title 32 U.S.C., which is still not a federal duty status—meaning the Governor 
retains control of the forces—but is backed with federal funding for long duration or 
large scope disaster responses. An example of this would be the National Guard support 
to the Southwest Border in 2006, known as Operation Jump Start, or the response to 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.   
If the National Guard force structure within an affected state does not have the 
right mix of resources for the disaster at hand, National Guard forces from other states 
can be requested by the affected state. The mechanism for this is the EMAC, which is a 
standing mutual support agreement between the 54 states and territories. EMAC forces 
are placed either in SAD or Title 32 status and fall under the control of the supported 
state’s National Guard command structure and Governor. Figure 2 depicts the Army’s 
‘all-of-nation’ approach to DSCA.   
 29 
 
Figure 2.  Overview of DSCA69 
                                                 
69 Source: DA, “ADP 3-28,” iv.  
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 When a disaster is too big for a state to handle with National Guard forces in SAD 
or Title 32, and all avenues of support through EMAC have been exhausted, the next tier 
of response is federal forces under Title 10 U.S.C., which can come from either the Army 
Reserve or the Active Army, depending on the types of resources needed and the location 
of the disaster. A Presidential Disaster Declaration under the Stafford Act and a request 
from the affected state are required before Title 10 forces can be committed to a DSCA 
mission in support of a disaster. At this point, a DSC is implemented. A DSC places a 
single commander and command staff over all forces regardless of duty status. The DSC 
normally comes from the affected state, and is generally a one- or two-star general 
officer. The DSC exercises command and control over both Title 32 and Title 10 forces, 
and reports through the DOD to the President and through the affected state’s Joint Force 
Headquarters (JFHQ) to the Governor.  Figure 3 outlines the DSC’s role.   
 
Figure 3.  Dual-Status Command Structure70 
                                                 
70 Source: DA, “ADRP 3-28,” 3-10.  
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There are existing constructs in place within the DOD to facilitate the request for 
and activation of Army forces for DSCA missions. The first of these is the EPLO 
program. The purpose of the EPLO program is to integrate select DOD personnel into 
civilian agencies for the purpose of coordinating preparedness, planning, and response 
activities in support of the DSCA mission. Each service component is directed to 
implement and manage an EPLO program independently. EPLOs are Reserve officers in 
the rank of O5 or O6 who are trained in DSCA and charged with conducting civil-
military and interagency liaison on behalf of their service component. The second is the 
DCO program, which places a team of military personnel in each FEMA region to 
coordinate directly with the FCO at the regional level. The DCO’s responsibility is to 
facilitate the process of requesting military support. States request support through their 
regional FCO, who then simultaneously sends the request up to FEMA and through the 
DCO up to the DOD. In this way, military units are already preparing to move by the 
time the formal request process is complete, which cuts down on the time it takes from 
requesting support to support arriving at a disaster response. Figure 4 provides more 
detail on the DCO and Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) responsibilities as well as 
regional alignment.71   
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Figure 4.  DCO and DCE Organization, Tasks, and Functions72 
The primary method of integrating military and civilian federal response to major 
disasters is the DCE. The DCE is led by a DCO and consists of nine personnel, including 
the DCO. There is a DCE and DCO collocated with each FEMA regional headquarters, 
for a total of 10 DCEs across the country. The DCO is the single DOD point of contact 
within the Joint Field Office (JFO) during a federal disaster response, and works closely 
with the FCO and State Coordinating Officer (SCO) for the affected state (or states). The 
DCE receives requests for military assistance from the FCO and SCO, validates them 
based on six criteria, and forwards them through DOD approval channels to the unit to be 
activated.73   
A resource request is only sent to the DCO for consideration and forwarding if the 
FCO determines that no other state or federal civil entities have the capability to fill the 
                                                 
72 Source: United States Northern Command, “USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05: Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities,” Department of Defense, May 8, 2006, C-19-5.  
73 Langowski, “DSCA,” 27-29.  
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request. While National Guard forces can be activated at the state level, either within the 
affected state or through EMAC from other states, federal military forces cannot be 
activated in any other way than by request from FEMA’s FCO through the DCO.  (As 
already discussed, IRA is an exception to this rule). When a request does come to the 
DCO, he or she must screen the request using the following six criteria before forwarding 
it through DOD channels for approval: legality, lethality, risk, cost, readiness, and 
appropriateness. These criteria are designed to ensure a support request is legally and 
operationally correct before it is forwarded through the DOD approval channels, thus 
increasing the speed of approval by avoiding the request being sent back for correction.74 
E. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES 
The origins of DSCA can be traced back to the founding of the United States. 
Initially, federal military resources were limited in capability due to a general dislike of 
the idea of a standing army. Following the War of 1812, military assistance to civil 
authorities increased in scope.  “Between 1868 and 1898 the military delivered succor on 
seventeen occasions involving fires, epidemics, floods, storms, tornadoes, and a locust 
plague.”75  Prior to the Federal Relief Act of 1950, there was no specific law governing 
federal disaster assistance or DSCA. States had to request aid from the federal 
government on a case-by-case basis. In 1979, the Federal Emergency Management 
Association was formed at the request of many state Governors to serve as a central 
agency to coordinate emergency management nationally.76   
There are several specific examples of DSCA through American history. One 
example was an order by then Secretary of War William W. Belknap for federal forces to 
send aid in the form of clothing and provisions to the victims of the Chicago Fire of 1871. 
At the mayor’s request, over 1,000 troops were sent to Chicago to assist with maintaining 
law and order. In response to the Galveston, TX hurricane in 1900, and at the request of 
then Governor of Texas J. D. Sayers, President McKinley sent thousands of rations, tents, 
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and other supplies to the stricken town. In addition, the Navy sent several ships to assist 
in disaster recovery efforts. In 1906, following the San Francisco earthquake, military 
units in the area acted under IRA to provide assistance to civil authorities within the 
crumbling and burning city. Not only were rations and supplies provided, but also 
thousands of troops to assist firefighters to control the fires burning around the city and 
assist law enforcement in maintaining law and order. These are only three of hundreds of 
examples of state and federal military support to civil authorities during their time of 
greatest need. This level of support has remained consistent to the present day in spite of 
the many post-9/11 changes in homeland security structures and modifications to DSCA 
doctrine following the Hurricane Katrina response.77   
F. NRF AND NIMS FOLLOWING 9/11 
The NRF and NIMS guide the conduct of disaster preparedness and response 
activities throughout the U.S. These were outlined in Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive #5 (HSPD #5), Management of Domestic Incidents, which was enacted in 
February 28, 2003. HSPD #5 incorporates many of the lessons learned by federal 
agencies during the response to the 9/11 terror attacks, and changes that were 
recommended by the 9/11 Commission in its report published in 2003. One of the most 
significant problems during the response to the 9/11 attacks was a failure of coordination 
between different agencies engaged in the response. The NRF and NIMS are 
complimentary. The NRF provides the overarching framework within which 
preparedness and response activities are conducted in order to bring all agencies at the 
local, state, and federal level onto a common set of operational practices. NIMS 
specifically directs activities in response to a disaster.78   
In order to be widely accepted and used, the NRF was made to be flexible and 
adaptable so it could apply to a wide variety of circumstances. Therefore, rather than 
directing specific tasks or organizational structures for emergency management agencies 
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at the state, tribal, and local levels, it focuses more on how the federal government is 
organized to support these agencies before, during, and after a disaster response. There 
are five key principles outlined in the NRF: “engaged partnerships, tiered response, 
scalable, adaptable, and flexible operational capabilities, unity of effort through unified 
command, and readiness.”79 The NRF is important to the Army’s DSCA mission because 
the Army must be capable of integrating into this framework during response operations. 
A portion of the NRF outlines Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), which is a method 
of categorizing resources into specific types and kinds in order to ensure a broader 
understanding of the capabilities of different resources. The ESFs are outlined in Figure 
5. The Army must categorize its own personnel and equipment into the ESFs prior to a 
disaster to facilitate rapid mobilization of the correct resources when they are requested 
by civil authorities. Civilians may not know the difference between an Apache Helicopter 
and a Blackhawk Helicopter, but they do know they need a resource with the capability to 
rescue stranded people from residential rooftops in a flooded area. Civilians request the 
capability they need (rooftop rescue of 10 civilians in flooded area), then send the request 
through channels to the DOD, which then mobilizes two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters 
to fill the request.80   
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Figure 5.  Emergency Support Functions and their Associated Lead Federal 
Agencies81 
 Within the NRF is the NIMS, which provides a framework for response to 
incidents across the full spectrum, from a small traffic accident to a major, multi-
jurisdictional disaster. There are five components that make up the NIMS framework: 
“Preparedness, Communications and Information Management, Resource Management, 
Command and Management, and Ongoing Management and Maintenance.”82  Of these 
components, the Army fits into the first four, with ongoing management and maintenance 
following an incident falling entirely on civil authorities. The first component, 
preparedness, is the responsibility of each individual agency and represents what is 
known as ‘steady-state’ operations, or all operations that occur before an incident takes 
                                                 
81 Source: Edwin A. Hurston, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” SlidePlayer, September 21, 
2012, accessed June 26, 2017, http://slideplayer.com/slide/4575595/.  
82 Alvarez, “Earth, Wind, Flu, Flood, and Fire,” 141. 
37 
place. This includes planning, organizing, equipping, training, and exercising response 
systems and processes. DHS gathered best practices in emergency management from all 
over the country to formulate NIMS and subsequently update it in 2008 to include lessons 
learned from Hurricane Katrina and other disasters. A major component of NIMS is the 
ICS, which dictates command structures and processes to be used by all agencies during 
all types of response operations. ICS was created by the fire service initially and was 
modeled after a military command structure. A key component of the NRF is unity of 
effort through unified command; this is where ICS really becomes important. For the 
purposes of ICS, NIMS, and the NRF, unified command “enables organizations with 
jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for an incident to support each other 
through the use of mutually developed incident objectives.”83  This principle allows police 
officers to exercise command authority over fire fighters and Department of Energy 
personnel to command Department of Transportation personnel. Each agency maintains its 
own independent authority and command structures, but the resources engaged in an incident 
response fall under the temporary authority of the ICS and the IC.84   
The process to get Army resources activated and deployed in response to a 
disaster is long and involved, which can slow the response time and delay needed 
resources arriving when they are needed. In the preparedness and planning phases of 
operations, it is important for planners and emergency managers to prepare for this 
process by having resource requests ready for expected incidents and establishing 
relationships with the various agencies involved in this process to facilitate rapid flow of 
information. As stated, the NRF and NIMS call for a tiered response to disasters within 
the U.S., which starts at the local level with first responders.   
Figure 6 shows how a tiered response is supposed to work. Incidents start out at 
the local level, with first responders conducting immediate lifesaving and disaster 
mitigation activities. As an incident expands, the resources at the local level can become 
exhausted, at which time the local level requests assistance from the state. The state sends 
83 Department of Homeland Security, “National Response Framework,” Department of Homeland 
Security, Second Edition, May 2013, 6.  
84 Alvarez, “Earth, Wind, Flu, Flood, and Fire,” 139-141. 
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in resources from other areas within the state that are not affected by the incident and 
from other states who voluntarily release their own resources to assist the affected state 
(who must then reimburse them for the cost). It is at this point that Army and Air Force 
National Guard resources can be mobilized by order of the Governor, and can be sent 
from other states by order of that state’s Governor. When resources at the state level are 
exhausted, the state requests resources from the federal level through FEMA. Federal 
agencies of all types provide resources to the state and ultimately to the local IC 
managing the incident. Federal resources come from civil government agencies until or 
unless they become exhausted or the specific type of resource needed is not available 
within the civil government. At that point, federal military forces can be activated and 
sent to assist with the incident response.85   
Figure 6.  Tiered Response Process Map86 
Federal military forces are activated and deployed through what is called a 
Mission Assignment (MA). This is a somewhat different process than that required to 
activate civil government resources. First of all, a Presidential Emergency or Presidential 
Disaster Declaration must be in place as required by the Stafford Act. This authorizes 
federal funding to support the incident response. This declaration initiates the formation 
85 Dunphy and Radel, “Request Processes for DSCA,” 47-48. 
86 Source: Ibid., 48.  
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of a JFO, managed by FEMA, with representatives from all of the federal and state 
agencies involved in the incident response. The JFO is led by the FCO, who is appointed 
from the LFA managing the incident. Two other key members are the SCO, representing 
the affected state’s Governor and Department of Emergency Management, and the DCO, 
representing the DOD and USNORTHCOM. Figure 7 shows how a state’s resource 
request results in federal forces being deployed. The request goes to FEMA at the JFO, 
where it is converted to an MA and sent to USNORTHCOM by the DCO. 
USNORTHCOM sends the MA to the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) under 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who then sends the MA to the SecDef for approval. Once 
the SecDef signs the MA as approved, an execution order (EXORD) is sent through Joint 
Forces Command (JFCOM) to Forces Command (FORSCOM), who orders a specific 
unit to mobilize to execute the MA. This process requires a great deal of coordination in 
order for an MA to flow seamlessly from the state level to the unit that will execute the 
mission, generally in less than 24 hours. This process is fairly effective and has been 
streamlined to increase the speed of approval. In many recent events, the DOD has 
mobilized resources ahead of a disaster so they are ready to deploy as soon as an MA is 
received, further reducing the time lag between request and response. Figure 7 
graphically depicts the MA approval process.87   
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Figure 7.  DOD Mission Assignment Process Map88 
G. DUAL STATUS COMMAND 
An overall slow and uncoordinated response to Hurricane Katrina, which affected 
much of the U.S. Gulf Coast region in 2005, gave rise to a new concept within the DOD. 
This concept was formalized in Joint Publication 3-28–Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities (JP 3-28) as DSC. The issue with the Hurricane Katrina response, at least 
from the DOD perspective, was that there was no established method of combining 
federal military forces (under Title 10 U.S.C.) and state military forces (under Title 32 
U.S.C.) under a single chain of command and a single commander who could exercise 
command authority over all forces under his or her command for the duration of the 
DSCA mission. The lack of a single coordinating entity resulted in confusion during the 
hurricane response efforts, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of both the Title 10 and 
Title 32 forces responding. The DSC is responsible both to the President and to the 
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Governor of the state or states within which the DSC is supporting operations. Mission 
assignments come to the DSC from either the FCO, who reports to FEMA, or the SCO, 
who reports to a State Department of Emergency Management (DEM). The DSC then 
sends mission assignments down to either Title 10 or Title 32 forces operating under 
various Area Commands (ACs), Unified Commands (UCs), or ICs according to the 
details of the mission assignments. Once an MA has been assigned to a unit, that unit 
falls under the direct authority of the civilian AC, UC, or IC for the duration of the 
mission, with the DSC providing sustainment to the unit in the form of food, water, and 
maintenance for equipment.89  Current doctrine designates the DSC as the preferred or 
most common command structure for military forces conducting DSCA missions.  
  In 2010, the DSC concept born from Hurricane Katrina was formalized and 
enacted into law in an update to Title 32 U.S.C. Generally, a Dual Status Commander is 
an Army or Air Force National Guard one- or two-star general activated in Title 32 status 
and given authority to command Title 10 forces. These officers must be trained and 
certified prior to a disaster’s occurrence so they fully understand all applicable laws and 
statutes governing Title 10 forces conducting DSCA as well as Title 32 forces conducting 
DSCA within their home state. The DSC can be a Title 10 officer, but it is preferred that 
it be a Title 32 officer who is more familiar with the laws governing military operations 
within the supported state. The first real test of the DSC came during the Hurricane 
Sandy response, in which both New York and New Jersey enacted DSCs to manage the 
military responses within each state. The DSC’s performance during this response was 
cumbersome and presented some problems due to ambiguity in the DSC doctrine outlined 
in JP 3-28. In addition, there is no real consensus on exactly how the DSC is supposed to 
be structured and implemented, leaving it up to each state to determine specific command 
and control relationships. Further complicating the DSC structure, during multi-state 
disasters, each affected state has the option of establishing its own separate DSC. This 
will be further addressed in Chapter IV.90   
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H. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT AND 
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AUTHORITY 
The FEMA MA process is not the only way for a state to receive support from 
military resources during a disaster. Each state has Army and Air Force National Guard 
resources available for use at the Governor’s discretion (following a state disaster or 
emergency declaration). Each state’s National Guard has a different composition and 
strength, which means not all states have the same types or kinds of resources available to 
them. This is where the EMAC comes into play. Developed in 1992 following the 
devastation of Hurricane Andrew, the EMAC is an interstate compact signed by all 54 
states and territories. It details the process to request assistance from other states (both 
civil and National Guard) and the process for providing assistance to a requesting state, 
including requirements for reimbursement of expenses by the supported state. The 
Governor of the requesting state assumes operational control of all National Guard assets 
that are sent in through EMAC until they are demobilized; the period of time these forces 
will work in the requesting state is agreed upon ahead of time. EMAC is especially 
important when a Governor declares a state disaster, but that declaration is not followed 
by a presidential disaster declaration (thus freeing up federal funding). In this case, 
additional resources must come from other states. EMAC facilitates this process by 
having agreements signed prior to a disaster occurring.91   
Another means for the Army to provide assistance to civil authorities outside of 
the auspices of a formal MA is known as IRA. Under IRA, local military commanders 
have the authority to provide immediate assistance to civil authorities in their local area 
(i.e., the county that surrounds a military installation) when requested by civil authorities. 
For a commander to provide resources under IRA, no prior approval from higher 
headquarters or the DOD is needed, nor is a Presidential Disaster Declaration needed. 
IRA has been used many times in the past, including in response to the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. IRA is not formalized by federal law, 
but it is codified in several DOD publications. Once a commander mobilizes resources 
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under IRA, they generally have 72 hours to either return those resources to their 
installation or gain approval through the MA process for those resources to continue their 
mission in support of civil authorities.92    
I. CONCLUSION 
This chapter was designed to form a foundation of knowledge on DSCA doctrine 
and regulations and the laws governing federal and state military operations within the 
U.S. It is important to begin with this understanding in order to comprehend fully the 
research questions that this thesis attempts to answer. Before the shortfalls in current 
DSCA execution can be clearly seen, one must fully understand how DSCA is intended 
to function. With this foundation of knowledge in mind, the following chapter will 
examine two DSCA cases to identify the successes and shortfalls in DSCA operations.   
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III. MANAGING HURRICANES AND EARTHQUAKES: 
SHORTFALLS IN INTEGRATION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are numerous instances where Army units and personnel have been 
deployed to support civil authorities, to include 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane 
Sandy. In addition, Army personnel have been used to secure airports and seaports 
following 9/11, to augment Border Patrol personnel on the U.S.-Mexico border, and 
provide humanitarian assistance to Americans in the wake of tornadoes, hurricanes, 
floods, fires, earthquakes, and a host of other natural disasters. In the days following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, over 9,000 Army and 
Air Force National Guard personnel from New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, 
and the District of Columbia were activated to assist with the search and rescue missions 
and provide aviation and logistics support to civil authorities. Within days, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld recommended to President Bush that up to 50,000 National 
Guard and Reserve troops be activated to secure the borders, airports, and key 
infrastructure throughout the country.93   
Major disasters such as this require rapid and effective coordination and 
integration between military forces and civil authorities. In these situations, lives can be 
saved or lost based on the effectiveness of this interagency coordination and the time 
elapsed from a request for military support to that military support arriving at the 
incident. To illustrate this, two cases will be examined. First, the military response to 
Hurricane Sandy in October 2012 will be addressed in detail. Second, the military’s 
participation in the Cascadia Rising earthquake response exercise in June 2016 are 
considered. These cases are different; one is a real-world response, the other is an 
exercise; one is a hurricane response, and the other is an earthquake response. They are 
also similar in that they included active duty, reserve, and National Guard forces 
                                                 
93 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Asks Call-Up of Reserves, as Many as 50,000," The 
New York Times, last modified September 14, 2001, accessed June 25, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/09/14/international/rumsfeld-asks-callup-of-reserves-as-many-as-50000.html.  
 46 
integrating with civil authorities across multiple states and jurisdictions and they both had 
ample time for planning and preparation before the disaster response phase of operations.   
B. CASE STUDY 1: HURRICANE SANDY 
Two main sources guide this study. First is the FEMA After Action Report (AAR) 
for Hurricane Sandy, dated July 1, 2013. This AAR gives a civilian perspective on the 
response effort, so it focuses more on how military resources were used during the 
response than how they were deployed and integrated. Second is a report from the U.S. 
Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) entitled, Toward a Unified Military 
Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander, dated April 2015. Written 
for a military audience, this report emphasizes the first use of a DSC in an actual 
response (as opposed to an exercise), showing what did and did not work with the 
implementation of the DSC. These documents together provide two perspectives on the 
Hurricane Sandy response efforts, both civilian and military. The SSI document provides 
a great deal of information related to the military response, while the FEMA document 
focuses more on the civilian federal response.    
1. Overview 
Hurricane Sandy made landfall at Brigantine, NJ on October 29, 2012 at around 
11:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. Sandy was the largest and most damaging hurricane 
to hit the Atlantic coast of the U.S., surpassed by Hurricane Katrina only in total cost. 
The response to Sandy saw over 4,000 Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and 
National Guard personnel activated for DSCA operations in New York alone. Of note, 
the response to Sandy was the first time that the DSC concept, created following 
Hurricane Katrina, was actually employed during a disaster response operation. Six states 
were given authorization to employ a DSC—New York, New Jersey, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—but only two states eventually activated 
their DSC to manage military response operations—New York and New Jersey. The 
other states chose not to activate their DSCs because they did not expect a significant 
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Title 10 response, thus the DSC would not be needed. Figure 8 depicts Hurricane Sandy’s 
path and landfall location.94   
Figure 8.  Hurricane Sandy Path to Landfall in New Jersey95 
Sandy, which was at one point a hurricane, was downgraded to a tropical storm by 
the time it made landfall along the Atlantic coast, affecting coastal cities from 
Washington, D.C., to New York City. In preparation for the storm’s landfall, beginning 
on October 22, the National Guards from each of the potentially affected states began 
activating personnel to prepare to respond. On October 27, DOD and USNORTHCOM 
94 Ryan Burke and Sue McNeil, “Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual 
Status Commander,” U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 
2015, 23-32.  Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report,” 
Department of Homeland Security, Washington D.C., July 1, 2013, 1-8.  
95 Source: National Weather Service, “Hurricane Sandy – October 29, 2012,” National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, accessed October 2, 2017, https://www.weather.gov/okx/HurricaneSandy.  
 48 
issued orders to send personnel, equipment, and supplies to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-
Lakehurst (JBMDL) in northern New Jersey to pre-stage and prepare for a Title 10 
response to the storm. On October 28, President Obama signed emergency declarations 
for Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Washington, 
D.C., When the path and strength of the storm became clearer on October 29, the 
President signed additional disaster declarations for Rhode Island, Delaware, and 
Pennsylvania and upgraded the declarations for New York and New Jersey to major 
disaster declarations.96   
The military response to Sandy in New York lasted until November 9, 2012. Over 
375,000 people were evacuated from New York City prior to the storm hitting the city. 
Within New York State, more than 305,000 homes were damaged or destroyed with an 
estimated 2,700 homes and businesses destroyed within New York City itself. This was 
largely the result of a massive storm surge, rather than high winds and rain. The state’s 
losses from damage exceeded $19 billion dollars, $5 billion dollars of which was from 
damage to the transportation infrastructure. This case study shows an example of a multi-
state, multi-jurisdiction response to a major disaster. It is also the first example of the use 
of a DSC during a response, which means the response involved both Title 10 and Title 
32 personnel.97   
2. Successes 
a. Interagency Coordination 
The mission assignment process as outlined in the NRF can be a slow and 
unwieldy bureaucratic process. This is counter to the need for rapid support and 
assistance to the victims of the storm. Due to this slow process hampering operations, the 
military command structures involved began assigning missions using a verbal orders of 
the commanding officer (VOCO) process. This was accomplished by phone and radio 
calls directing the movement of military resources, rather than paper or computer 
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documentation. While this did result in confusion at times, overall it facilitated rapid 
military assistance where it was needed. The biggest problem that occurred during the 
response was a Marine Corps unit self-deploying from a Navy ship off the coast of New 
York City onto Staten Island without any coordination with the DSC. This could have 
presented a significant problem for the entire response, not to mention challenging the 
sovereignty of New York by landing federal forces without prior approval. By using the 
VOCO process, the DSC took control of the Marines on Staten Island and began 
directing their activities as a part of the larger JTF.98   
b. Liaison Activities 
The nature of no-notice disaster responses requires multiple agencies to quickly 
find ways to effectively work together toward a common goal. This means that forces 
work closely with an agency with which they have never worked before and have no 
knowledge of their capabilities or limitations. For this reason, the practice of exchanging 
liaison officers between different agencies becomes extremely important. Liaisons 
facilitate shared knowledge and understanding between functionally and geographically 
separate entities in a way that phone, email, and radio communications cannot. Liaisons 
can educate the supported agency about the supporting agencies capabilities and 
limitations, participate in planning sessions, and actively communicate back to the 
supporting agency. Hurricane Sandy was no exception to this. Military liaisons were 
placed throughout the Joint Operating Area (JOA), such as at the JFO, FEMA, and 
military service component headquarters. Many senior commanders considered the 
practice of exchanging liaisons to be one of the most significant contributions to success 
during the Hurricane Sandy response.99   
c. Strategy 
The forward-leaning strategy employed by USNORTHCOM and the National 
Guards from each of the affected states was effective at providing immediate support to 
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civil authorities following the storm’s landfall. The DOD was criticized following 
Hurricane Katrina of responding too slowly. The DOD did not initiate preparation and 
movement of federal forces until after they had been requested. Later with Sandy, the 
DOD and USNORTHCOM anticipated the requests that would come and deployed an 
array of forces to JBMDL, NJ so they would be able to respond immediately when 
requested.  “This push vs. pull approach is a paradigm shift of sorts for DOD compared to 
past response efforts. Placing personnel and equipment assets on standby status in 
geographic proximity to the JOA offered the DSC additional capabilities to consider 
during the response, which ultimately proved beneficial.”100  In the past, DOD resources 
were not deployed to a staging area until they were requested. The time it takes to deploy 
resources can significantly delay their employment. By deploying resources before they 
are requested, the DOD can reduce the time from request to response to only hours rather 
than days. It is important to note that while this method was politically expedient, given 
the slow federal response to Hurricane Katrina and the upcoming 2008 presidential 
election, mobilization of Title 10 forces is extremely expensive, especially if the 
mobilized resources are ultimately not requested. In the case of Hurricane Sandy, the 
ability of the DOD to respond rapidly to resource requests made a difference in the 
overall response effort. Detailed analysis of resource gaps in various jurisdictions is 
needed in order for the DOD to deploy the resources that are most likely to be needed for 
a disaster response.   
3. Shortfalls Highlighted by Case Study 
a. Dual Status Command 
There were several issues with the DSC in New York during the Hurricane Sandy 
response. First, the command structure between National Guard (Title 32) and federal 
(Title 10) forces changed several times in the first three days of the preparation and 
response phases. Several unit commanders were unaware that the DSC existed at all and 
continued to report directly to the Joint Coordinating Element (JCE), which had been 
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established at JBMDL to coordinate federal forces responding to the storm. The DSC 
construct directs that the DSC reports directly to both the ARNORTH commander and 
the Adjutant General of the state that established the DSC. At that time, DOD doctrine 
and policy had not yet been updated to include guidance for the implementation of the 
DSC during DSCA operations. By implementing the JCE, which had never been done 
before, USNORTHCOM confused the command structure for Title 10 forces throughout 
the operation. This primarily affected the command structure of the military responders, 
rather than affecting the response efforts in the disaster zone. The larger issue with the 
JCE is the fact that USNORTHCOM changed the established response process during the 
response.   
b. Mission Assignment Process 
Leading up to and following Sandy’s landfall, directives from the President and 
the commander of USNORTHCOM to the forces assisting in New York were to move as 
rapidly as possible and provide support whether they had been asked to provide it or not. 
A fragmentary order (FRAGO) from USNORTHCOM on November 2, 2012, directed 
the following:101  
•  Get missions. Start with menu of DOD capabilities in the JOA that 
can be applied to support FEMA requirements. 
•  Do not wait for mission assignment paperwork. Coordinate with 
FEMA and the DCOs. 
•  Apply total force capabilities to accomplish missions. Operate on 
VOCO mission assignments when possible. 
•  When you get a mission: execute. Clean up paperwork later by 
coordinating with FEMA and the DCO.102 
This undermined the mission assignment process outlined in the NRF. Requests 
for support are supposed to come from the local level to the county level, then to the state 
level, then to FEMA. At every level, the lead agency provides resources to meet the 
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request if possible or forwards the request on if that level’s resources have been 
exhausted and cannot fill that request. This established process was circumvented from 
the highest levels of government, which resulted in a great deal of confusion at lower 
levels of command.103   
c. DSCA Education 
This case study shows evidence that many senior commanders and government 
officials within the DOD, USNORTHCOM, and the units providing support during 
Hurricane Sandy did not have the needed education and familiarity with DSCA in order 
to be effective. Several unit commanders did not understand the DSC command structure 
and many did not understand, or chose to ignore, the mission assignment process. Senior 
officials gave orders to subordinates to reduce red tape and find missions, including 
pushing the use of VOCO orders. All of this expedited support, certainly, but at the 
expense of command and control, coordination, and in some cases legal and regulatory 
authorities. Federal law prohibits Title 10 from operating within the U.S. except when 
requested by civil authorities under the Stafford Act. Military commanders do not have 
the authority to deploy their forces to support an incident response without a valid request 
for assistance.   
4. Conclusions Derived from Case Study 
a. Lean, but Do Not Push Forward 
Leaning forward, or preparing for a disaster response before it happens when 
possible, is a practice the DOD and the Army should sustain for future operations. In a 
situation like that faced leading up to Hurricane Sandy’s landfall, where there were 
several days prior to the disaster to prepare for it and pre-position resources for a more 
rapid response, the DOD must act before the event occurs. That said, leaning forward 
should not extend to self-deployment or employment of military assets without a request 
from civil authorities to justify the employment, such as the Marine Corps landing in 
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New York City. Incidents like that result in confusion, delaying response efforts and 
ultimately putting lives at risk. Military resources are in a supporting role during DSCA, 
not in the lead. Civil authorities direct actions and operations in accordance with the NRF 
and in coordination with affected states and FEMA.104   
b. Delineate Chain of Command before Deploying Forces 
When possible, the Title 32, Title 10, and DSC chain of command needs to be 
established and circulated within the DOD prior to DOD forces being sent forward for 
disaster response operations. Once established, the chain of command and command 
structures should remain unchanging where possible, recognizing the fact that disaster 
response operations can be unpredictable. In addition, the JCE concept caused confusion 
in the command structure between the DSC and the JCE. DSCA doctrine relies on the 
DSC for command, control, and coordination of all Title 32 and Title 10 military forces. 
By establishing the chain of command before deployment, we can reduce confusion and 
achieve unity of effort in support of our civilian partners.105   
c. Maximize the Use of Liaisons 
One of the most important functions during DSCA is liaison between military and 
civilian agencies and between military service components and command elements. 
Liaisons facilitate open communication and coordination between different agencies and 
command structures, with the goal of maintaining a common operating picture (COP) and 
shared knowledge and understanding throughout the disaster response enterprise. 
Liaisons must be trained on the regulatory and legal frameworks within which their 
element operates as well as the doctrine for DSCA so they can confidently and accurately 
coordinate with whatever agency they have been assigned.106   
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d. Expand DSCA Education for DOD Personnel 
The most significant problems with the Hurricane Sandy response can be traced 
back to ineffective training or a lack of education on topics related to DSCA, especially 
among Title 10 commanders and staff.  “Active Component forces demonstrated a degree 
of ignorance or disregard to the mission assignment process that was reaffirmed through 
command guidance. By abandoning processes and procedures, some Title 10 forces 
supplanted (rather than supported) local authorities’ efforts.”107  This undermines not 
only the DSC and the military command authorities, but also undermines the authority 
and autonomy of the supported state and the state’s Governor. There are serious legal 
implications for some of the actions taken by Title 10 forces during the Sandy response, 
especially the unauthorized self-deployment of Marines onto Staten Island.108  The 
political environment at the time played a role in this; the storm made landfall only days 
before the 2008 presidential election, so there was major pressure from the highest levels 
of government to make sure there was not a repeat of the response to Hurricane Katrina.   
C. CASE STUDY 2: CASCADIA RISING 
Information for this case study is drawn from two main sources. First is the 
FEMA After Action Report for the Cascadia Rising 2016 Exercise, dated September 6, 
2016. Second is the Washington Emergency Management Division (WEMD) After 
Action Report for the same exercise, dated January 5, 2017. These documents provide 
two perspectives on the Hurricane Sandy response efforts, both civilian and military. The 
WEMD document provides a great deal of information related to the military response, 
while the FEMA document focuses more on the civilian federal response. 
1. Overview 
Cascadia Rising 2016 (CR16) was a four-day functional exercise that took place 
across dozens of counties, cities, and tribes within Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. CR16 
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was based on a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) rupture that produced a magnitude 9.0 
earthquake along the 700-mile long CSZ fault line that stretches from Vancouver Island 
in British Columbia, Canada all the way to Northern California. Following the 
earthquake, massive tsunamis would strike the coastline causing major flooding 
throughout Washington and Oregon coastal areas.  Figure 9 shows the Cascadia 
Subduction Zone in relation to the U.S. Pacific coast.109   
 
Figure 9.  Cascadia Subduction Zone Fault Map110 
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The purpose of the CR16 exercise was to test the state’s catastrophic disaster 
response plans for a CSZ event. In addition, the exercise was meant to test the ability of 
county and state emergency operations centers (EOCs) to establish themselves and 
communicate and coordinate with outside agencies to deliver resources to the affected 
areas. In addition to the state-level events of CR16, three other federal-level exercises 
were conducted concurrently. The following is a list of the concurrent exercises, their 
dates, and the focus of each exercise:  
•  Cascadia Rising Exercise (June 7–10, 2016) – Emergency Operations/ 
Coordination Centers  
•  Vigilant Guard Exercise (June 5–13, 2016) – National Guard support to civil 
authority  
•  Ardent Sentry Exercise (June 7–15, 2016) – National Defense support to civil 
authority  
•  Joint Logistics Over the Shore Exercise (June 10–15, 2016) – Disaster relief 
by sea111 
 In total, these exercises in Washington State saw the activation and deployment of 
six brigade-sized task forces to provide DSCA to 26 counties and 12 tribal nations. In 
addition, federal agencies such as FEMA, USNORTHCOM, ARNORTH, U.S. 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE), and many others participated in the Vigilant Guard, Ardent Sentry, and Joint 
Logistics over the Shore (JLOTS) exercises.112   
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a. Civil-Military Cooperation 
For two years leading up to the CR16 exercise, the Washington Military 
Department (WAMD) conducted a program of outreach and liaison between Washington 
National Guard personnel and county, city, and tribal leaders throughout Western 
Washington. This systematic effort ensured that planning for the CSZ scenario was 
vertically integrated from the local to state level and contributed a great deal to the 
successes of the exercise. The Washington National Guard assigned soldiers and airmen 
who lived and worked in various counties to be National Guard liaisons with their local 
emergency management personnel. These soldiers and airmen had a vested interest in the 
success of the planning and the exercise because the impacts of the CSZ scenario affected 
themselves and their families directly. They were also subject matter experts on the local 
areas in which they lived and worked.113   
b. Use of National Guard and EMAC Forces 
The CR16 validated the effectiveness of the use of National Guard forces from 
other states requested through the EMAC.  “The Guard has a direct connection to the 
community, is available to conduct pre-planning, connects to the intent of the Governor, 
is an ‘operational reserve’ of the total force, and is less likely to impact national mission 
assurance requirements.”114  It is important to remember that the resources that can 
arrive in the shortest amount of time and with the greatest capability is the resource that 
can be used. At times, that means Title 10 forces will be used before Title 32 forces. The 
benefits of using the National Guard in a scenario such as this are massive.115   
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c. Command and Control Structure 
The DSC construct requires the DSC staff to report through two chains of 
command. First, they must report to the Adjutant General of the supported state, which is 
a two-star command. Second, they must report to USNORTHCOM, a four-star 
command, or one of the subordinate service component commands, such as ARNORTH, 
which are three-star commands. The requirements for the DSC staff to conduct reporting 
to these higher-level commands increase as the level of command increases. During a 
DSCA response of this magnitude, the DSC staff is already overwhelmed with tasks to 
support the civil support operations on the ground. During CR16, USNORTHCOM 
established an intermediary Joint Task Force, called JTF-X, which was established as a 
two-star command and was responsible for Title 10 forces across Washington, Oregon, 
and Idaho. This intermediary staff was at the same level at the Adjutant Generals in each 
state, which did two things for the DSC. First, it relieved the DSC of the administrative 
requirements to report to a three- or four-star command. Second, it put tasking authority 
of Title 10 forces at the same command level as the Title 32 authority of the Adjutant 
Generals, which ensured that Title 10 forces working under higher command levels did 
not trump Title 32 command levels because of the rank of the commander.116   
3. Shortfalls Highlighted by Case Study 
a. Understanding of ICS/NIMS 
It is important for military personnel conducting DSCA to have an understanding 
of the NRF, NIMS, and ICS prior to providing support to civil authorities. These 
concepts are the foundation of how civil authorities organize themselves and conduct 
disaster response operations. During CR16, it was found that below the senior staff level, 
the majority of soldiers and airmen have no familiarity at all with the NRF, NIMS, or 
ICS, and therefore challenges occurred in integration of military and civilian resources to 
provide a rapid and effective response to the disaster scenario.117   
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b. Liaison Capabilities 
The effectiveness of liaison between military and civilian entities can make or 
break a disaster response operation, especially one of this magnitude. During CR16, it 
was discovered that the technical proficiency of the selected liaisons was not where it 
needed to be. Most liaisons had minimal, if any, experience and had little knowledge of 
the operating areas within which they were working. In addition, the liaisons needed to 
have an understanding of not only their own operating area, but also the operating areas 
of all adjacent, higher, and lower command elements in order to provide accurate counsel 
to civil and military command elements. It was also discovered that the liaison officers 
with existing relationships with civil authorities, established during the planning phases 
leading up to CR16, were noticeably more effective than the liaisons who did not have 
pre-established relationships.118   
c. State-Level Integration 
Integration of liaison functions at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 
with the Emergency Support Function (ESF) representatives was severely lacking during 
CR16. First of all, there were not enough military liaisons at the SEOC to assist multiple 
ESFs at the same time. Secondly, the liaisons at the SEOC were not technically proficient 
in DSCA or knowledgeable about National Guard and Title 10 capabilities and 
limitations to the degree needed to be effective at that level.   
4. Conclusions Derived from Case Study 
a. Sustain Civil-Military Relationships 
The relationships established between military personnel and their civilian 
partners at all levels were important contributors to the overall success of the CR16 
exercise. The military functions using a very linear chain of command. Authority is 
derived from rank structures and command levels, which largely takes the importance of 
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personal relationships out of the equation when it comes to executing operations. 
Conversely, civilian agencies do not function on a defined, linear chain of command. 
Each city, county, tribe, and state has a different composition of personnel and functions. 
The operations chief in one county will likely have a different set of duties and 
authorities than the operations chiefs of any neighboring counties. For this reason, the 
importance of personal relationships during operations cannot be overstated. Not only do 
these relationships facilitate communication during operations, but they also facilitate the 
rapidity of the request for forces process, mission assignments, and integration of military 
forces into the civilian command structures.119   
b. Improve Education of Military Personnel 
CR16 made it clear that training and education related to the NRF, NIMS, ICS, 
and all applicable laws and regulations that govern DSCA was severely lacking 
throughout the force. There was a focus on training senior leaders in these subjects prior 
to execution of CR16. Still other personnel had received this training in various forms 
during the performance of other related duties. In spite of this, the majority of personnel, 
especially at the task force level, had little or no training in these areas. This lack of 
training made it difficult for military formations to rapidly and effectively integrate with 
the civilian command structures and provide life-saving support to victims of the CSZ 
scenario.120   
c. Improve Liaison Capabilities 
Across the board, CR16 highlighted the need for competent, trained, and 
knowledgeable liaisons at every level of operations. Liaisons need to be familiar not only 
with the capabilities and limitations of their own state’s National Guard formations, but 
also with Title 10 capabilities and limitations for all service components. Liaisons also 
need to be trained and proficient in the NRF, NIMS, ICS, and the laws and regulations 
that govern DSCA. At the state level, the liaisons need to also have a working knowledge 
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of the ESFs and how military resources fit in with the ESF designations. During a disaster 
response is not the time to train these liaison personnel. They must be trained and 
identified during the planning phases of operations, which will not only make them more 
effective during a disaster response, but also gives them an opportunity to establish 
relationships with various civilian agencies. These relationships pay dividends during 
operations.121   
D. CONCLUSION 
These two cases are overall very different. The Hurricane Sandy case tells the 
story of a massive state and federal response to a real-world catastrophic event on the east 
coast of the U.S. The CR16 case is a planned exercise involving a large number of state-
level agencies, but a minimal federal presence below the senior command level, for a 
response to an event on the west coast of the U.S. In spite of the differences between 
these two cases, there are striking similarities that provide common ground for analysis. 
Both events involved both Title 32 and Title 10 forces operating across multiple states, 
both included the activation of multiple DSCs and the establishment of a 
USNORTHCOM intermediary command element (the JCE for Sandy and the JTF-X for 
CR16), and both involved integration of military forces with civilian response agencies. 
The shortfalls identified in each of these cases have similarities as well, which allow us to 
derive some common conclusions for improvements that need to be made in military 
DSCA operations.   
This chapter has identified several shortfalls in the Army’s ability to provide 
effective DSCA during either a real-world or exercise disaster response. It is obvious at 
this point that the most significant shortfall is the Army’s inability to effectively integrate 
with civil authorities during DSCA operations. The case studies for Hurricane Sandy and 
the Cascadia Subduction Zone are only two of many examples where failure to 
effectively integrate resulted in major problems for DSCA missions. The next chapter 
will address each of these shortfalls in more detail.   
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IV. CURRENT SHORTFALLS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter shows the gaps that exist in the current Army DSCA structure. The 
most significant gap is a lack of education/knowledge of DSCA within the ranks of the 
Army. Many leaders receive training, but the soldiers on the ground responding to an 
incident have basically no knowledge of DSCA in any way. The next gap is a lack of 
liaison and integration between the Army and civilian agencies prior to a catastrophe. 
This includes building relationships with federal, state, and local agencies, integrating 
DSCA into civilian emergency response plans, and integrating Army forces into civilian 
structures rapidly during an emergency response. The last gap is a shortfall in integration 
of planning between military and civilian agencies prior to an event, including 
anticipation of needs following a catastrophic disaster. This chapter is meant to paint a 
picture; when the Army responds, the soldiers are un-trained to conduct their mission, 
know nothing about the civilian agencies they will work with, and have not been 
integrated into any civilian emergency response plans. The job gets done, that’s what the 
Army does, but it could be so much more effective.   
B. CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON 
Both of the cases in Chapter III highlighted the importance and necessity of 
effective liaison between military and civilian agencies and between military formations 
at different command levels and from different service components. Liaisons facilitate 
communication and shared knowledge and understanding between elements that may 
never before have worked together. In addition, during a catastrophic disaster scenario, 
traditional forms of communication may be degraded or unusable. A trained, proficient, 
and knowledgeable liaison can be the difference between success and failure when lives 
are on the line following a major disaster. Commanders need to select liaisons who are 
knowledgeable not only in their area of expertise within the military, but also 
knowledgeable on the NRF, NIMS, ICS, and the applicable laws and regulations that 
govern DSCA. This training cannot wait until a disaster occurs for it to be done. It must 
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be done during steady-state operations so these liaisons can effectively integrate with 
civilian agencies and other military formations immediately.      
Liaison is a commonly used function within the Army. When different units join 
together as a task force or joint task force, each unit sends one or two personnel to the 
other unit or units to facilitate communication and integration in support of the mission.  
“Liaison is a form of communication for establishing and maintaining mutual 
understanding and cooperation […] ensuring unity of purpose and action.”122  The 
liaison is not a decision-maker or director of operations; rather, the liaison ensures that 
the efforts of both elements are integrated and that both elements have a shared COP. At 
the DOD, USNORTHCOM, ARNORTH, and NGB levels, civil-military liaison with 
other federal civilian agencies such as DHS, Department of State (DOS), and the FBI is 
common. There is also a standing Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) under 
USNORTHCOM that meets regularly with dozens of federal military and civilian 
agencies to coordinate homeland security and homeland defense efforts related to the 
DOD.123   
While liaison is a common function in military operations, the duties of a liaison 
are generally not taught in formal military education programs. The result of this lack of 
training is generally ineffective interagency coordination efforts. By the time a liaison 
learns his or her job and forms the needed relationships with civilian partners, they are 
reassigned and the process starts all over again with the next selected individual. Liaisons 
have the potential to be ‘combat multipliers’ during DSCA operations. The liaison 
function is never more critical than in a DSCA environment, especially in response to a 
catastrophic disaster.   
The principal value added by [liaisons] lies in their contribution to an 
environment where dialogue can more readily occur. They also serve to 
cut through layers of bureaucracy to find the right action officer at their 
sending service when needed. In an inter-agency environment, [liaisons] 
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would serve as interpreters of DOD culture and would bring to the table 
perspective and knowledge of DOD unique capabilities.124 
Liaisons are also the key to establishing professional and personal relationships 
with interagency partners and civilian agencies at all levels. The combination of 
established relationships and effective liaison are the lynch-pin to an effective DSCA 
operation.   
C. PRE-DISASTER RELATIONSHIP BUILDING 
In addition to liaison, relationships are extremely important in the conduct of 
operations with civilian agencies. Civilian agencies do not function the same way that 
military formations function. There are not the same clean lines of authority and chains of 
command. This presents a number of challenges, especially with integrating outside 
agencies and military forces into said civilian agency. Personal relationships become 
important. Knowledge of the key personnel at the agency or county government can 
facilitate rapid integration and employment of military forces in support of the disaster 
response.  
With the exception of the DCO/DCE integrating with each of the 10 FEMA 
regional headquarters, there is little in the way of pre-disaster integration between 
military and civilian agencies below the USNORTHCOM/ARNORTH level for federal 
forces or the state level for National Guard. Having established relationships down to the 
local level does two things for the Army. First, it facilitates integrated planning between 
the Army and civil authorities before a disaster occurs, which in turn expedites the 
request process for military support and thus the arrival of military support when it is 
needed. Second, it facilitates mutual education between the Army and civil authorities; 
each has an opportunity to learn about the function and organization of the other.   
Civilian agencies function differently than military organizations. The military 
strictly adheres to a linear rank structure and chain of command. This structure facilitates 
command and control of forces during combat operations by placing decision authority at 
the command level at every echelon of forces. Commanders make decisions based on 
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input from their staff and operations are executed. The civilian ICS was developed using 
the military as a model, but it has many key differences due to the foundational difference 
between military and civilian agencies. Civilian agencies are often bureaucratic in nature 
and have the influence of political appointees to consider. Rather than an IC making 
decisions and the entire command structure responding to them, the IC is more of a 
coordinator working to build consensus. The nature of civilian agencies makes personal 
relationships more important than rank structures. For the military to be effective, it must 
work to establish personal relationships with civilian partners at all echelons from local to 
federal.  “Engaging the partnerships of agency leaders while engaged in interagency and 
organizational response is essential to preparedness. These preparedness activities must 
be conducted well in advance of an incident response.”125   
The NRP and NRF recognize the need for effective interagency and 
interdisciplinary coordination and integration for effective disaster response and 
recovery. The ‘whole community’ approach has been proven to be the best way to 
respond to, mitigate, and recover from a major disaster. It is incumbent upon the leaders 
of civilian and military response agencies and ESFs to proactively build relationships 
with agency partners at all levels. The potential result of failing at this task is loss of life 
during a disaster due to slow, uncoordinated response efforts. This idea has been 
eloquently stated by Leonard H. Guercia, Jr. in his thesis entitled Integration of Training 
Civilian and Military Disaster Responders.   
Effectively preparing for emergency response takes collaboration. The 
best plans have little practical impact in a real-world response if 
emergency and risk coordinators do not work effectively together at all 
levels of a response. This starts on the ground at the scene of the 
emergency or outbreak by field teams and transition to collaborating 
among all levels of local, state, and federal response.126   
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D. SOLDIER EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
Another common problem between these two cases is the level of education of 
military personnel in a number of DSCA-related subjects. This was especially evident 
during Hurricane Sandy among Title 10 forces and senior officials. There is a large 
difference between DSCA and traditional military operations. First of all, the laws that 
govern DSCA, such as the Stafford Act and the Posse Comitatus Act, are critical 
knowledge for military personnel operating within the homeland. Secondly, the NRF, 
NIMS, and ICS must be fully understood in order for military personnel and formations 
to rapidly and effectively integrate into these ad-hoc civilian incident command structures 
and provide assistance to civilians in need. In addition, the military command structures 
that are used for DSCA, such as the DSC, need to be fully understood in order for 
military units from multiple service components to combine into an effective joint force. 
Traditional chains of command still exist and are still used, but failure to integrate into 
the DSC during a DSCA mission is a recipe for disaster, as was seen when the Marines 
landed on Staten Island during the Hurricane Sandy response.   
Further, it is not only important to train commanders and senior staff officials on 
these subjects. All personnel need to have a familiarity with the basics of a DSCA 
mission and where the military fits into the civilian command. At the lowest level, junior 
officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are the ones leading troops on the ground 
and interfacing directly with incident command staffs and civilian first responders. At 
times, young NCOs will lead small teams alongside civilian search and rescue or law 
enforcement personnel conducting independent operations. These personnel need to 
know what they can and cannot legally do in support of civil authorities. They need to 
know where they receive guidance and direction for operations and where they will sleep, 
eat, and go to the hospital in case of injury. These structures exist and are very robust, but 
they are also very different than military structures. Terminology is also different, with 
the same terms meaning different things between military and civilian operations.   
According to CALL, a clearinghouse for after action reports and current tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs), the Army is generally unprepared to conduct DSCA 
missions.   
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Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) within the United States is not 
a new mission for the military. Despite this, Center for Army Lessons 
Learned collection and analysis teams routinely report that tactical units 
do not understand the constraints placed upon them by the body of 
statutes, regulations, and presidential orders pertaining to responding to 
disasters and incidents at home. This is because the primary mission of 
tactical units is expeditionary warfare, and that has been their focus for the 
past eight years in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the 
Philippines.127  
There is no requirement for soldiers in the Army to be trained on DSCA 
operations or integration with civil authorities.   There is specialized training available for 
personnel assigned to positions such as DCO or DSC, but for the majority of soldiers, the 
first experience they have with civil authorities is during an actual mobilization for a 
DSCA mission. This presents a problem when Army units deploy to support ICs during a 
disaster response. Soldiers are trained to perform their jobs under a military command 
structure in combat operations. During a DSCA mission, the Army and other elements of 
the DOD are in a supporting role, under the operational control of the IC or whatever 
civil authority is in the leading role for the disaster response.   
Current training available for topics related to DSCA and Homeland Security are 
minimal. ARNORTH provides a DSCA course that consists of three phases for a total of 
30 hours of training. The Joint Forces Staff College offers a 40-hour Homeland Security 
Planners Course that is focused on training field grade officers (O4 to O5) and federal 
civilian agency leaders. NGB offers three courses related to Joint Staff and Joint 
Operations Center (JOC) operations and mobilization of resources for domestic 
operations, each of which is three to five days in length. The directive behind these 
course offerings is to provide “specific training in military units most likely to be 
involved in military support to civil authorities.”128  This is a rather vague directive, and 
it has been left up to each service component within the DOD to develop and implement 
the training they deem necessary to meet this requirement. There are two main problems 
with these course offerings. First, they are all focused on training mid- to senior-level 
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leaders on the basics of DSCA. This is a good thing, but it leaves out the majority of the 
personnel who will be involved in a DSCA mission, namely the junior leaders leading 
troops on the ground. Second, these courses are optional unless soldiers are assigned to 
USNORTHCOM, ARNORTH, or a related senior command element. Again, the format 
of this training leaves out the majority of the personnel who will actually be interacting 
and liaising with civil authorities during a disaster response.129   
E. KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE 
There is generally a large disparity in DSCA experience between Title 10 and 
Title 32 personnel. National Guard personnel are activated routinely all over the country 
to provide support to flooding, major storms, wildfires, and a host of other natural and 
man-made disasters. This gives National Guard personnel a wealth of experience in 
DSCA that the majority of Title 10 personnel do not receive. In addition, since 9/11 the 
focus for the Army overall has been overseas deployments in support of the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT). These deployments are borne primarily by title 10 forces, though the 
National Guard has deployed thousands of soldiers overseas in support of GWOT 
operations. When disasters do occur, laws, regulations, and budgetary limitations require 
Governors to rely first on their National Guard formations before requesting federal 
support. Even then, the majority of federal support comes from federal civilian agencies, 
rather than from the Active military. For this reason, and “due to the complexity of the 
homeland operating environment, traditionally educated military officers are typically not 
adequately prepared to be successful in that environment.”130   
In addition to the gap in knowledge of DSCA operations, there is a gap in 
knowledge of the DSCA area of operations (AO), which is the communities within the 
U.S. where disasters occur. Active Duty soldiers are stationed all around the country and 
overseas, but they are generally not experts on the area in which they are stationed. Few 
are stationed where they lived before joining the Army and most are transferred to a new 
installation every two to three years. For this reason, the Army must rely on the regional 
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expertise of local civil authorities in preparing for and executing DSCA missions. This 
need reinforces the necessity of liaison and relationship building between the Army and 
civil authorities addressed earlier in this chapter.   
In 2007, the ASD(HD&ASA) published guidance on the needed competencies for 
personnel involved in DSCA. Table 1 is a recreation of the published competencies table 
provided in the November 14, 2007 memorandum.131   
Table 1.   Homeland Defense/Homeland Security Professional Competencies132 
In-Depth Knowledge Understanding Awareness 
High Importance Medium Importance Medium Importance 
Threats to national security Budgeting and planning NCTC 
Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 




National Security Policy, HLS 
policy, national strategies 
Information sharing and 
Intelligence Analysis 
State & Local Fusion 
Centers 






Beyond Goldwater Nichols 
Dept of Defense/Homeland 
Defense Policy 
Congressional Oversight/ 
Understanding of authorities/laws 
Research and education 
networks 
Government and Strategic 
Communications 
International Affairs and 
Cooperation/Assistance 
Operational programs and 
capabilities 
Role of National Guard 15 National Planning Scenarios, 
NRP/NIMS/ICS 
Human capital and 
resources operations 
DOD Organization, Role of 
USNORTHCOM/NORAD, 
Role of USPACOM/ 
USSOUTHCOM, Use of 
military forces in CONUS 
All Hazards: Natural Disasters & 
Hazards, Infectious Diseases & 
Health Affairs, Domestic Nuclear 
Detection, WMD/ Proliferation, 
Terrorism/ Counterterrorism 
Resiliency of social, 
political and economic 
processes, infrastructure 
and institutions 
Strategic planning process Public Affairs Continuity of Government 
Local/Tribal/State/Federal 
Government Relationships & 
Coordination (HS Field) 
Systems of Government (fed, 
state, county, local, municipal) 
Executive/ Legislative/Judicial 
 




CJCS DSCA EXORD Cyber, Transportation, 
Agriculture & Food Security 
 
Information Management 
DHS Organization & Roles Roles and capabilities of NGOs 
and the private sector 
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F. PLANNING AND ANTICIPATION OF NEEDS 
Each of the cases discussed in Chapter III shows the stark reality of a catastrophic 
disaster and the effect it can have on basic services needed to sustain life. Electricity, 
clean water, food, shelter, and a myriad of other services that most Americans take for 
granted become instantly unavailable. Transportation networks fail, preventing victims 
from leaving an area and first responders from entering to assist. The NPD directs that 
Americans be capable of sustaining themselves and their families for up to 72 hours 
(three days) until assistance can arrive from local, state, or federal agencies. The vast 
majority of Americans are not capable of sustaining themselves for this long. Many high 
risk populations such as the young and the elderly are in desperate need as soon as the 
power goes out. Life sustaining technologies run on electricity from either the power grid 
or a separate generator. Generators need to be refueled, medication needs to be 
refrigerated, and the first responders in the affected areas are themselves victims of the 
disaster.   
The realities of a catastrophic disaster require state and federal agencies to 
anticipate needs before such an event occurs. The DOD and National Guard are no 
different. The National Guards for multiple states were activated and staged in 
anticipation of Hurricane Sandy’s landfall. DOD and USNORTHCOM sent units to 
JBMDL, NJ in anticipation of immediate needs following Sandy’s storm surge. This 
attitude of anticipation was a far cry from the ‘wait and see’ attitude held by military 
commanders during Hurricane Katrina, and it may have resulted in lives saved and 
property damage reduced from what it could have been. Anticipation must not extend to 
self-deployment without prior approval. The processes in place to request resources from 
the local level and then fill resources first from the state level and then from the federal 
level must be followed. It can be assumed that in a major hurricane or CSZ earthquake 
scenario, Title 10 forces will likely be needed to assist in the immediate aftermath. Under 
this assumption, forward-staging of resources is prudent because it massively reduces the 
time it takes to deploy these resources when they are requested to fill a valid need.   
This anticipation needs to be factored into the planning for these disasters, as was 
demonstrated during CR16. Two years of planning culminated in a four-day exercise, all 
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based on the assumption that local and state resources would be immediately 
overwhelmed and outside forces through EMAC and from Title 10 would need to deploy 
immediately following an earthquake. This planning needs to be integrated at all levels, 
from city to county, county to state, and state to regional and federal. It needs to include a 
plan for the civilian and military command structures that will be used, such as the DSC, 
and how Title 10 and Title 32 forces will be integrated. 
Army commanders are faced with a challenge when it comes to DSCA. Their 
primary mission is to prepare their units for deployment overseas for combat operations. 
They are responsible for their federal mission above all else. This leaves little time for 
commanders to devote to preparing for DSCA missions. This means that units that are 
sent to support civil authorities must rapidly prepare themselves and their equipment to 
perform what is often a completely different mission than they would normally perform. 
Still, the types of missions Army units perform during DSCA are not wholly different 
than what they would do in combat operations. Hurricane Katrina provides a good 
example of the wide range of capabilities the DOD was called upon to provide in support 
of the recovery from the storm. The following is a list of mission assignments that DOD 
resources performed during the Katrina response:  
•  Conduct search-and-rescue operations 
• Perform security-capabilities assessment and provide security-
capabilities advice and technical assistance 
•  Collect and evacuate live persons to temporary processing centers 
•  Collect and remove bodies of deceased persons 
•  Restore flood-control systems 
•  Transport and distribute ice, water, food and medical supplies 
•  Disease prevention and control 
•  Planning for the quarantine of areas within New Orleans 
•  Quartering and sustaining of FEMA headquarters support element 
and relief workers 
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•  Health and medical support 
•  Debris removal 
•  Restoration of basic utilities and key transportation routes (land 
and water) 
•  Geospatial-surveillance products and evaluations 
•  Logistical support at key air and sea distribution nodes 
•  Temporary housing 
•  Long-range communications between headquarters nodes and 
firefighting133 
 Knowing these are the types of things civil authorities need from the Army allows 
Army leaders to plan for these operations in their DSCA planning. It also requires Title 
10 and Title 32 entities to coordinate their planning efforts to ensure coverage of all 
requirements in pre-disaster plans. If the National Guard in a particular state has the 
capability to conduct water purification operations, perhaps the Title 10 water 
purification assets should be planned for a state that does not have that capability. This 
kind of detailed planning affects command elements at every echelon, from DOD to the 
smallest National Guard unit. Detailed planning also prevents parallel work by different 
elements. It is counterproductive for both the National Guard and ARNORTH to write 
independent contingency plans for a particular scenario. In these cases, when a disaster 
occurs, there are different plans being executed at the Title 32 and Title 10 levels, which 
can cause confusion and delays in resources reaching the areas where they are needed.134   
Hand-in-hand with planning for DSCA operations is the anticipation of the needs 
of victims and civil authorities. Anticipating needs during the planning process is nothing 
new for the Army, but there is a difference between anticipating the sustainment 
requirements for Army personnel and equipment during missions and anticipating 
mission assignments before resources are requested. It requires an in-depth knowledge of 
                                                 
133 Lombardo, “Collaboration or Control,” 55-56.  
134 Ibid., 69-71.  
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emergency response plans for dozens of different scenarios and an understanding of the 
resource needs of different jurisdictions.   
The slow DOD response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the problems inherent 
in the current mission assignment process. According to law and regulation, the DOD 
must wait until they are requested to mobilize resources in support of a major or 
catastrophic disaster. DOD resources are readily available, but they take time to mobilize 
and deploy. From the time of request, it can be days before DOD resources arrive at a 
disaster staging area to provide support. In response to this, the response to Hurricane 
Sandy featured a policy of anticipating needs rather than waiting for requests. While this 
presented its own set of problems, it did improve the DOD’s reaction time in providing 
support following the hurricane’s landfall and storm surges in New York and New Jersey.   
This method of providing support is known as ‘push,’ as opposed to ‘pull,’ where 
resources must be pulled down to the lowest level rather than pushed there before they 
are requested. A push system allows for much shorter reaction times from when resources 
are requested to when they are employed, but it requires a thorough risk assessment be 
done. If the DOD forward-stages assets that end up not being requested, then taxpayer 
money has been wasted by staging those assets. Conversely, if a requested resource has 
not been pre-staged when it is requested, the same problematic slow response will be 
required regardless of the pre-staging efforts with other assets.   
G. CONCLUSION 
Clearly there are shortfalls in the Army’s ability to provide effective DSCA. In 
the years following Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, the Army has made changes 
to improve its DSCA capabilities. The earthquake exercise also highlighted some 
important issues. Significant gaps remain, namely in liaison and relationships, knowledge 
and education, and planning and anticipation of needs. Each of these gaps plays a role in 
the effectiveness of integration between the Army and its civilian partners during DSCA 
missions. The Army must make changes to how it conducts DSCA in order to remedy 
these shortfalls. The next chapter will address a possible solution that the Army can 
employ to correct these shortfalls.   
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V. A DSCA CORPS: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines a possible solution to the problems listed in Chapter IV. By 
creating a new functional area and associated force structure within the Army, comprised 
of DSCA specialists with extensive training in DSCA, the state can respond effectively to 
homeland crises. This DSCA Corps will have a primary mission to conduct DSCA, rather 
than a primary mission to deploy overseas for combat operations. The recently-created 
Cyber Warfare branch of the Army provides a template for this new DSCA functional 
area. DSCA force structure must be created within the Active Army, Army Reserve, and 
Army National Guard in order to balance capabilities, with a goal of aligning forces 
regionally to create a core group of leaders that are subject matter experts (SMEs) in their 
particular region. This new branch will remove the three major gaps identified in Chapter 
IV without changing DSCA operations in any fundamental way.    
B. SOLUTION 
 One potential solution to the problem faced during crisis in our case studies is the 
creation of a new functional area within the Army with a sole focus on the DSCA 
mission. The mission of these DSCA Corps units is to integrate into civilian agency 
emergency response plans, form and maintain relationships with civilian partners, and be 
the first Army elements to respond to a DSCA mission. During a response, the DSCA 
Corps will bridge the gap between civilian response agencies and the rest of the Army 
and other DOD forces. The Army currently has 28 branches and 15 functional areas 
within its force structure. Table 2 provides a list of these branches and functional areas.   
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Table 2.   List of Army Branches and Functional Areas135 
Branch/Functional Area Title Numerical Identifier 
Medical (Six Specialties) Various 
Infantry 11 
Engineer 12 
Field Artillery 13 
Air Defense Artillery 14 
Aviation 15 
Cyber Warfare 17 
Special Forces 18 
Armor 19 
Telecommunications Systems Engineering (FA) 24 
Signal 25 
Judge Advocate General 27 
Electronic Warfare (FA) 29 
Information Operations (FA) 30 
Military Police 31 
Strategic Intelligence (FA) 34 
Military Intelligence 35 
Financial Management 36 
Psychological Operations 37 
Civil Affairs 38 
Space Operations (FA) 40 
Adjutant General 42 
Public Affairs (FA) 46 
U.S. Military Academy Professor (FA) 47 
Foreign Area Officer (FA) 48 
Operations Research/Systems Analysis (FA) 49 
Force Management (FA) 50 
Acquisition (FA) 51 
Nuclear and Counterproliferation (FA) 52 
Information Systems Management (FA) 53 
Chaplain 56 
Simulation Operations (FA) 57 







                                                 
135 Department of the Army, “Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer 
Professional Development and Career Management,” Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington 
D.C., December 3, 2014.  
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 Perusing the list in Table 2, it is evident that there are no branches or functional 
areas with a DSCA or Homeland Security related title. In reality, the only certification a 
soldier can gain in DSCA is a voluntary Personnel Development Skill Identifier (PDSI), 
D7A–DSCA Specialist. This PDSI is gained by taking seven hours of DL training and 
attending a three-and-a-half-day course, which is taught by personnel from the NGB and 
USNORTHCOM/ARNORTH. This training is far from sufficient to train soldiers to meet 
the myriad of challenges inherent in DSCA operations.   
 For the purposes of this thesis, the DSCA Functional Area (FA) has been 
designated FA20. The numerical designation 20 has no significance other than it is not 
currently in use by any other branch or FA. The numerical designation would likely 
change were this proposed new FA be adopted by the Army.   
C. FUNCTIONAL AREA 20 – DSCA  
 The purpose of the DSCA Corps (FA20) is to bridge the gap between civil 
authorities and military forces before, during, and after a catastrophic disaster within the 
U.S. and its territories. FA20 fills this gap by providing force structure and a corps of 
subject matter experts who can develop and maintain relationships with civil authorities, 
facilitate the rapid deployment of Army units to support disaster response operations, and 
provide expert command and control of Army and joint forces during disaster response 
operations.   
1. Mission 
 The Defense Support to Civil Authorities Functional Area (FA20) fulfills the 
Army’s obligation to provide support to the citizens of the United States during their time 
of greatest need. Whether in response to a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or pandemic 
outbreak, the Army must be prepared to provide resources in the form of supplies, 
equipment, and personnel to augment the capabilities of civil authorities when they 
become overwhelmed.   
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2. Proponent 
 DSCA is an FA aligned under the Operations Support functional category. All 
branches and FAs in the Army are categorized under one of three functional categories; 
Operations, Operations Support, and Force Sustainment. The Operations Support 
functional category includes the functions associated with intelligence, communications, 
cyber warfare, and training, developing, and educating the force.136  The Commander, 
ARNORTH is the proponent for DSCA. A proponent is defined as, “an Army 
organization or staff that has been assigned primary responsibility for material or subject 
matter in its area of interest.”137  For FA20, ARNORTH is in the perfect position to 
serve as the proponent; it already reports directly to USNORTHCOM and has 
responsibility for operations within the United States, which includes all DSCA missions.   
3. Purpose 
 DSCA is a unique mission for the Army in that it does not involve training for 
combat operations. As such, DSCA soldiers and leaders have an entirely different focus 
than their counterparts in more traditional Army formations. The purpose of the DSCA 
Corps is to facilitate the rapid deployment of military assets to any location within the 
United States and its territories to provide immediate assistance to civil authorities for 
disaster recovery operations. DSCA units serve as JTF headquarters, providing a 
command and control element with subject matter expertise in everything related to 
DSCA and facilitating the interface of traditional Army formations, as well as formations 
from other service components, with the civil authority’s command structure. DSCA 
personnel are experts in the NRF, NIMS, and ICS. They develop relationships with 
partners in federal and state civil agencies which can be leveraged during disaster 
response operations.   
                                                 
136 DA, “DA PAM 600-3,” 11.  
137 Department of the Army, “Army Regulation 25-1: Knowledge Management and Information 
Technology,” Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., May 14, 2008.  
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DSCA missions are undertaken constantly all over the country, primarily by the 
National Guard. According to the 2018 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement, “on 
any given day we have more than 4,000 Guard members conducting domestic 
operations.”138  While the DSCA Corps is not designed for deployment overseas for 
combat operations, military support within the homeland is in high demand and will keep 
the DSCA Corps occupied. The DSCA Corps will be constantly interfacing with civil 
authorities so, when a disaster occurs, the DSCA mission can be executed rapidly and the 
right resources can be mobilized immediately.   
4. Functions 
 The DSCA Corps has three primary functions. First, it must conduct liaison with 
civil authorities during steady-state operations in order to establish relationships that can 
be leveraged during disaster response operations. Second, it must prepare contingency 
plans for response to various natural and man-made disasters within each FEMA Region, 
in coordination with USNORTHCOM and ARNORTH. Third, it must provide forces to 
serve key command, control, and liaison functions during disaster response operations, 
serving as the core of a JTF or Dual Status Command staff structure.   
5. Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Structure 
MOSs are alpha-numeric designators that denote a soldier’s skill qualifications. 
For FA20, there are two primary MOSs.  20A is the MOS for most officers and 20C is 
the MOS for most enlisted soldiers. These are the basic MOSs for the majority of DSCA 
Corps personnel. There are four additional MOSs that have been identified as well, which 
are for more specialized personnel.  20B is for officers who have already been qualified 
as a 20A and have subsequently been trained as a DCO.  20D and 20E are for enlisted 
personnel who have already been qualified as a 20C and have subsequently been trained 
as either a DCE or EPLO specialist.  20Z is for enlisted soldiers who are qualified as a 
                                                 
138 National Guard Bureau, “2018 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement: Building a Force for the 
Future,” National Guard Bureau, Washington D.C., April 19, 2017, 15.  
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20C, 20D, or 20E and then reach the rank of E8 or higher. Table 3 depicts these MOSs in 
a different format.   
Table 3.   Proposed List of FA20 Military Occupational Specialties139 
Officer/Enlisted MOS Title 
Officer 20A DSCA Generalist 
Enlisted 20B Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) (O6 and Above) 
Enlisted 20C DSCA Specialist 
Enlisted 20D Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) NCO 
Enlisted 20E Emergency Preparedness Liaison NCO (EPLO) 
Enlisted 20Z Senior DSCA NCO (E8 to E9) 
 
6. Training and Education 
The current program of instruction for DSCA consists of one DL phase with 10 
hours of training and one three-and-a-half-day resident phase. This certifies soldiers as 
‘DSCA Specialists’ and grants them the PDSI D7A. This is a total of around 30 hours of 
training on DSCA, which is nowhere near the amount of time needed to qualify soldier as 
an FA20. The amount of training needed, in both time and content, for each branch and 
functional area in the Army varies widely, and is in addition to initial entry training. The 
content of training for FA20 soldiers should take the current DSCA program of 
instruction (POI) and expand upon it. Table 4 shows the minimum requirements for FA20 









                                                 
139 DA, “DA PAM 600-3.” 
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Table 4.   Training Requirements for FA20 Qualification140 
Course Title Training Hours Delivery 
IS-100.b – Introduction to Incident Command System (ICS) 3 DL 
IS-200.b – ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action 
Incidents 
3 DL 
ICS-300 – Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents 24 Resident 
ICS-400 – Advanced ICS for Command and General Staff 
– Complex Incidents 
16 Resident 
IS-700.a – Introduction to National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) 
3 DL 
IS-800.b – Introduction to National Response Framework 
(NRF) 
3 DL 
Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Awareness 8 DL 
L449 – ICS Curricula Train-the-Trainer (ICS-TTT) 32 Resident 
K146 – Homeland Security Exercise & Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP) 
16 DL / 
Resident 
DSCA Phase 1 10 DL 
DSCA Phase 2 20 Resident 
Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and 
Integration Training Course (JRSOI-TC) 
24 Resident 
Joint Staff Training Course (JSTC) 24 Resident 
Joint Operations Center Training Course (JOC-TC) 32 Resident 
TOTAL 218 (28 Days)  
 
In order to facilitate training for Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National 
Guard soldiers, the majority of branch and functional area qualification training course 
are offered in two formats. The first is oriented to the Active Army and requires soldiers 
to attend the entirety of the training period in residence. In this case, this would mean 28 
days of training in residence at an Army base. The second is oriented to the Army 
Reserve and Army National Guard and combines a DL phase 1 and resident phase 2 
consisting of up to 15 days (including travel to and from the training location). In this 
case, it would mean limiting the resident training to 13 days (two days are required for 
travel, totaling 15 days) and converting 15 days (120 hours) of training to a DL format. 
This could either be synchronous, as is done with the FA30 Information Operations DL 
training, or asynchronous, as is done with most other branch and FA DL training.    
                                                 
140 All IS/ICS training information is from the FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI) 
website, https://training.fema.gov; all DSCA and Joint training information is from the secure National 
Guard Bureau (NGB) J371 website, https://gko.ngb.army.mil.  
 82 
Army branch and functional area proponents develop Centers of Excellence 
(COEs) to serve as central training and qualification management activities. For the 
DSCA Corps and FA20, a Center of Excellence (COE) should be created at the 
ARNORTH headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, TX. The Homeland Defense and Security 
Center of Excellence would serve as the ARNORTH executive agent for proponent 
actions.   
7. Insignia 
Each branch and functional area has a distinctive collar insignia that represents 
the branch or FA in some way. The Infantry Branch has crossed muskets, the 
Transportation branch has a ship’s steering wheel, and the Signal branch has crossed 
signal flags overlaying a torch. All of these symbols have heraldic significance to the 
origin and nature of the branch or functional area. The DSCA Corps needs a unique and 
significant collar insignia of its own. Figure 10 is a proposed FA20 collar insignia. It is a 
golden torch overlaying a black shield. The torch represents the advanced elements of a 
formation, also known as a vanguard or advanced party. This refers to the idea that the 
DSCA Corps units and personnel are the first to provide assistance to civil authorities, 
even before an event occurs, and then they lead the way for all follow-on forces. The 
shield represents defense of the United States against all enemies. It is black because the 
nature and scope of each DSCA mission is not known until a disaster occurs, which could 
be of any type or any scope.   
 
Figure 10.  Proposed DSCA Corps (FA20) Collar Insignia 
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In addition to a unique collar insignia, the DSCA Corps needs a shoulder patch 
for soldiers to wear on their uniforms. The ARNORTH mission has been habitually given 
to the U.S. 5th Army. It is fitting then that the DSCA Corps units should wear the 
shoulder patch of their proponent, ARNORTH, and thus the patch of the 5th Army as 
depicted below. According to the Army Institute of Heraldry, the significance of the 
ARNORTH shoulder patch is as follows: “The flag colors of red, white, and blue are self-
explanatory. The outlined figure of the mosque is symbolic of the country in which Fifth 
Army, the previous designation of the unit, was originally activated. The letter ‘A’ 
indicates ‘Army’, and conforms in general, to designs used by the First and Third United 
States Armies.”141  The 5th Army was constituted in Oujda, French Morocco on 
December 1, 1942, immediately following the Allied invasion of North Africa, known as 
Operation Torch.  Figure 11 depicts the 5th Army shoulder patch.142   
 
Figure 11.  ARNORTH and 5th Army Shoulder Patch143 
                                                 
141 The Institute of Heraldry, “US Army North,” Office of the Administrative Assistant to the 
Secretary of the Army, Washington D.C., accessed July 13, 2017, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/
Catalog/HeraldryMulti.aspx?CategoryId=6198&grp=2&menu=Uniformed%20Services.  
142 United States Army North, “World War II,” United States Army North, accessed July 13, 2017, 
http://www.arnorth.army.mil/History/Pages/default.aspx.  
143 Source: Institute of Heraldry, “US Army North.”  
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D. FORCE STRUCTURE 
USNORTHCOM is the GCC responsible for North America and its territories, 
including DSCA within the U.S. ARNORTH is the Army Service Component Command 
(ASCC) subordinate to USNORTHCOM which is responsible for directing all Army 
operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR. ARNORTH is also the proponent for the 
DSCA Corps and is responsible for directing all DSCA Corps operations within the U.S. 
and its territories.   
The DSCA Corps is organized into two DSCA Groups, each with five subordinate 
DSCA Battalions. The DSCA Groups are each responsible for five FEMA regions, and 
each DSCA Battalion is aligned with one FEMA Region. The composition of each of 
these battalions differs depending on the FEMA Region to which it is aligned. Generally, 
there will be one DSCA Company for each state within the FEMA region. Larger states 
may have two companies aligned with them, and some companies may be responsible for 
two or more small states.   
Another unique component of the DSCA Corps units is that they are comprised of 
more than one component of the Army. DSCA Groups are Title 10 active component, 
DSCA Battalions are Title 10 Army Reserve, and DSCA Companies are Title 32 
National Guard. This is done for several reasons, which are detailed in subsequent 
paragraphs. Figure 12 depicts the general structure and makeup of a DSCA Group.144   
 
                                                 
144 The personnel and force structure needed to create the DSCA Corps would need to be taken from 
other branches and functional areas that already exist in the Army, unless Congress were to authorize a net 
increase in the Army’s end strength to accommodate the increase.  This is addressed further in Chapter VI.  
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Figure 12.  DSCA Group Force Structure (Proposed) 
1. DSCA Groups 
Each DSCA Group is commanded by a Colonel (O6) and is responsible for 
DSCA activities within five FEMA Regions. The 1st DSCA Group, headquartered at Fort 
Gordon, GA, is responsible for the eastern United States and the 2nd DSCA Group, 
headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, TX, alongside ARNORTH and the HDS-COE, is 
responsible for the western United States. A DSCA Group receives guidance on DSCA 
operations from ARNORTH and passes down guidance to its five subordinate DSCA 
Battalions. DSCA Groups are made up of roughly 180 Active Army (Title 10) soldiers. 
During disaster response operations, a DSCA Group can deploy as a JTF, DSC Title 10 
Staff, or augmentation for other federal command and control elements.   
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2. DSCA Battalions 
Each DSCA Battalion is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel (O5) and is 
responsible for DSCA activities within a single FEMA Region. DSCA Battalions are 
comprised of Army Reserve soldiers and are stationed as close as possible to the FEMA 
Regional Headquarters for their FEMA Region. DSCA Battalions receive mission 
guidance from their higher headquarters, either the 1st or 2nd DSCA Group, and push 
guidance down to their subordinate DSCA Companies operating in each state within the 
DSCA Battalion’s designated region. DSCA Battalions number roughly 80 soldiers (Title 
10 reservists), the vast majority of which are traditional reservists with duty one weekend 
per month and 15 days in the summer for annual training. DSCA Battalions can deploy as 
staff augmentation to a JTF or DSC Title 10 Staff. They can also serve as a Task Force 
(TF) Headquarters when another headquarters is not available. At its core, the Battalion’s 
primary mission is to interface with civil authorities during operations to ensure the flow 
of communication and coordination remains open at all times.   
3. DSCA Companies 
Each DSCA Company is commanded by a Major (O4) and is responsible for 
DSCA activities within a single state. Comprised of roughly 120 National Guard (Title 
32) soldiers, DSCA Companies are stationed collocated with the state National Guard 
headquarters element. DSCA Companies receive guidance from their higher DSCA 
Battalion and from the state National Guard headquarters. The majority of the soldiers in 
a DSCA company are traditional Guardsmen who perform duty one weekend per month 
and 15 days in the summer for annual training. DSCA Companies deploy as directed by 
the state’s Governor or the President to support missions within the state, region, or 
nationally as needed. The DSCA Company’s mission is to conduct liaison between 
military elements and civil authorities in small teams. They can also be activated to 
augment the state’s JTF or JOC at the state level.   
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4. Additional Force Structure – DCE/EPLO 
Creation of the DSCA functional area within the Army does not change the form 
or function of the DCE or the EPLO program. These programs are funded and managed 
by the DOD, not the Army, and thus can be filled with personnel from any service 
component as long as they have been deemed qualified for the duty. A great deal of 
coordination is needed between the DCE and the regional DSCA Battalion and between 
the EPLO program and the DSCA Groups. This coordination is needed because DSCA 
Corps formations have no authority to direct the actions of the DCE or EPLO. In fact, the 
DSCA Corps and its capabilities actually augment the mission and capabilities of the 
DCE and EPLO to make them more effective.  
E. STATIONING 
1. Regional Alignment 
ARNORTH and the Homeland Defense and Security COE are headquartered at 
Fort Sam Houston, TX, along with one DSCA Group with responsibility for the five 
western FEMA Regions. The second DSCA Group is stationed at Fort Gordon, GA, with 
responsibility for the five eastern FEMA Regions. Each DSCA Battalion is stationed at 
an Army or Joint installation within their assigned FEMA Region, preferably as close as 
possible to the FEMA Regional Headquarters location.  Figure 11 shows how each of the 




Figure 13.  DSCA Group and DSCA Battalion Stationing (Proposed)145  
In the stationing plan depicted in Figure 13, Fort Sam Houston, TX, and Fort 
Gordon, GA, are the two main installations where the Active Army portions of the DSCA 
Corps will be stationed. The DSCA Battalions are all Army Reserve elements, and thus 
are only staffed with their full complement of personnel during monthly drill assemblies 
and annual training periods. Therefore, the stationing requirements for these battalions is 
significantly less than the requirements for the Active Army DSCA Groups. For the 
DSCA Companies, each state’s National Guard Headquarters is depicted in Figures 14–
23, as well as the location of any Army Reserve and Active Army DSCA Corps elements 
within that region.   
                                                 
145 Adapted from FEMA data. 
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Figure 14.  FEMA Region 1 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)146 
 
 
Figure 15.  FEMA Region 2 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)147 
                                                 
146 Adapted from FEMA data. 
147 Adapted from FEMA data. 
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Figure 16.  FEMA Region 3 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)148 
 
 
Figure 17.  FEMA Region 4 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)149 
                                                 
148 Adapted from FEMA data. 
149 Adapted from FEMA data. 
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Figure 18.  FEMA Region 5 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)150 
 
 
Figure 19.  FEMA Region 6 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)151 
                                                 
150 Adapted from FEMA data. 
151 Adapted from FEMA data. 
 92 
 
Figure 20.  FEMA Region 7 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)152 
 
 
Figure 21.  FEMA Region 8 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)153 
                                                 
152 Adapted from FEMA data. 
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Figure 22.  FEMA Region 9 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)154 
 
 
Figure 23.  FEMA Region 10 DSCA Company Alignment (Proposed)155 
                                                                                                                                                 
153 Adapted from FEMA data. 
154 Adapted from FEMA data. 
155 Adapted from FEMA data. 
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2. Subject Matter Experts 
By aligning DSCA Battalions from the Army Reserve and DSCA Companies 
from the Army National Guard with each FEMA Region and state, we can accomplish 
two things. First, there is now a specialized DSCA unit responsible for direct liaison and 
coordination with each state and region. This allows the Army and Joint forces to be 
integrated into the planning efforts of various civil authorities and establishes ongoing 
relationships between the Army and the civil authorities that may need assistance during 
a disaster. Second, the personnel assigned to these reserve component units live and work 
in the regions and states to which they are assigned. This creates within each unit not 
only a group of DSCA specialists but also a group of SMEs on the state and region with 
which they are responsible for coordinating and conducting liaison. These personnel also 
have a vested interest in ensuring planning and preparation for their assigned state or 
region are effective, because they and their families live and work within their AOR.   
3. Relationship with FEMA Regions/States 
The relationships between each type of DSCA unit and the various levels of civil 
authorities involved in emergency management is important. This relationship facilitates 
integrated planning at all levels. It expedites the request process for Army resources 
during a disaster. It allows a more rapid integration of military resources into the civilian 
ICS for disaster response operations. From the perspective of civilian agencies and 
government employees, especially at and below the state level, the military has a 
tendency to come in and take over operations. This perception is a result of the lack of 
relationship building and liaison on behalf of the military, especially at the federal level, 
and a gap in knowledge of the laws and regulations that govern military disaster response 
operations in the homeland. It is incumbent upon the military, and thus the Army, to 
educate its civilian partners on its capabilities, limitations, and responsibilities when it 
comes to DSCA.   
This can be a major challenge for many reasons, not the least of which is the 
significant differences between military and civilian organizations. Current efforts by 
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USNORTHCOM to educate stakeholders on the fundamentals and practice of DSCA are 
targeted at DOD personnel and are centrally conducted only a few times per year at major 
military installations. Additional informational briefings are conducted for federal 
government officials on a regular basis. For this reason, the majority of emergency 
management officials at the state level and below throughout the country do not have 
access to this kind of training. In order to correct this problem, DSCA education must be 
projected down to the state and local level. The DSCA Corps is a vehicle through which 
this can be accomplished.156   
F. TEMPLATE FOR CREATING A NEW BRANCH 
The DOD is taking steps to address the threat of cyber terrorism, implementing 
several significant changes within its organization and mission to address this threat. In 
2010, the DOD created the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as a sub-unified 
combatant command subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). 
USCYBERCOM’s mission is to direct the operations and defense of DOD computer 
networks and conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations.157  Within 
USCYBERCOM, each service component has its own service component command 
subordinate to USCYBERCOM. This research focuses attention specifically on Army 
Cyber Command (ARCYBER) for two reasons. First, of the four service component 
cyber commands, ARCYBER was created the most recently. Second, the creation of 
ARCYBER brought significant changes within the Army’s force structure that the other 
service components did not experience when their cyber commands were created. Before 
ARCYBER came into existence, the Army had no centrally coordinated effort or agency 
designed to address the emerging cyber threat.   
The origins of ARCYBER can be traced back to 2002, when the Army established 
the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM) in order to remedy 
technology compatibility issues between Army combatant commands. NETCOM created 
                                                 
156 Osterholzer, “Education in Action,” 3-6.  
157 United States Strategic Command, "U.S. Cyber Command," United States Strategic Command, 
March 2015, accessed September 25, 2016, https://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/2/Cyber_Command.  
 96 
a single Army computer network, known as LandWarNet, which existed within the 
World Wide Web and was managed by the Army Global Network Operations and 
Security Center (AGNOSC). In 2004, the Army combined the AGNOSC with the Army 
Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT), creating a Theater Operations Center at 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This new operations center was then capable of both defending the 
Army’s computer network and protecting the integrity of the data stored therein. Network 
operations were divided in two. The AGNOSC focused on network defense, defending 
LandWarNet against attack or incursion from outside the network, while ACERT focused 
on internet network operations, responding to information system incidents within the 
network.158   
To address the offensive side of computer network operations, the Army created 
the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) at approximately the same 
time NETCOM was created. In 2008, in order to synchronize internal, defensive cyber 
operations with offensive cyber operations, the Army organized NETCOM and INSCOM 
under the Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC). Later that year, the 
first provisional network warfare battalion was activated and organized under INSCOM; 
this was the first unit organized specifically to conduct cyber warfare offensive 
operations as its primary mission.159  Up to this point, personnel responsible for 
operating the Army’s cyberspace capabilities were ‘borrowed’ from other commands 
such as military intelligence, information operations, or the signal corps; most of these 
personnel were not trained for cyber warfare operations, though they may have had 
civilian educational backgrounds in this area or on-the-job training related to cyber 
warfare. The creation of a dedicated cyber workforce improved the Army’s ability to 
conduct cyber warfare operations, rather than relying on a piecemeal force of personnel 
with other primary duties.   
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In 2009, the Secretary of Defense directed each of the service components to 
identify elements to serve as service component commands under the new 
USCYBERCOM, scheduled for creation the following year. Initially, the Army selected 
USASMDC to serve as the interim Army Forces Cyber Command (ARFORCYBER). 
The initial concern was that the creation of USCYBERCOM and a new Army Cyber 
Command would reduce the existing capabilities of INSCOM and NETCOM to conduct 
operations by adding additional levels of bureaucracy to the mix. After a thorough 
analysis of the current Army force structure and the cyberspace operations mission set to 
date, the Army Chief of Staff directed that the interim ARFORCYBER become the new 
permanent ARCYBER no later than the end of June 2010. NETCOM and INSCOM were 
officially moved under ARCYBER, as well as many of their existing subordinate 
elements, and a new Army Cyber Brigade was created to replace the smaller provisional 
network warfare battalion created in 2008. The new Cyber Brigade, designated the 780th 
Military Intelligence Brigade (Cyber), was organized under INSCOM and became 
operational in late 2011, more than doubling the size of the operational cyber force.160   
With the activation of ARCYBER in 2010, the first ARCYBER commander, 
Lieutenant General Rhett Hernandez, established three major lines of effort for the 
command to become fully operational and integrated into Army operations.  “The lines of 
effort included operationalizing cyber, developing Army cyber capabilities and capacity, 
and recruiting and retaining Army cyber warriors.”161  The Army was years behind other 
service components in developing its cyber capability, so a major focus in the first years 
of ARCYBER’s existence was on unifying effort across the service components in order 
to achieve an effective joint DOD cyber capability. This benefited the Army greatly 
because it could draw on the experiences of its sister services’ efforts to combat the cyber 
threat.162   
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From 2012 to 2015, ARCYBER supported dozens of joint and combined cyber 
operations exercises, focusing on the integration of cyber operations into conventional 
Army operations; this was not possible before the command’s inception. General 
Hernandez oversaw the formulation of a series of cyber warfare military occupational 
specialties (MOSs) for enlisted soldiers and a cyber warfare area of concentration (AOC) 
for officers and warrant officers. He also oversaw the creation of the first Army cyber 
doctrine and Army cyber strategic plan, which charted ARCYBER’s mission out to the 
year 2020. The focus for ARCYBER is to defend Army computer networks against 
accidental damage or intentional infiltration. This mission is essential to continued Army 
operations, and overall DOD operations in support of the National Security Strategy, 
because of the Army’s strong reliance on computer systems and automation of many 
major weapon systems.163   
In 2012, USCYBERCOM directed that the service component cyber commands 
form a Cyber Mission Force consisting of 133 Cyber Mission Teams, 41 of which would 
come from the Army. These teams are only now becoming fully active, with an initial 
operating capacity date of October 1, 2016. The Army chose to divide its share of the 
Cyber Mission Force so that half of the force would come from the active Army, one 
quarter would come from the Army Reserve, and one quarter would come from the Army 
National Guard. The purpose of the Cyber Mission Teams is threefold. First, they defend 
DOD networks against attacks from adversaries of every kind. Second, they conduct 
offensive cyber operations in support of conventional forces. Third, they manage the 
DOD information systems network.164   
A great deal of effort is under way to integrate cyber operations with conventional 
operations to create a COP for battlefield commanders. Conventional land operations are 
already extremely complex, where dozens of different lines of effort from infantry on the 
ground to aviation support and supply chain logistics must be expertly coordinated in 
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order to achieve desired effects on the battlefield. The added complexity of cyber 
operations, which can incorporate information operations, psychological operations, 
electronic warfare, and cyber network warfare exceeds the typical soldier’s capabilities 
and expertise. The Army has developed multiple stand-alone systems to automate various 
kinetic systems, such as field artillery, mortars, and air defense systems, as well as non-
kinetic systems such as human resource management and supply chain management. 
These systems do not generally exist on the internet, so they are fairly well protected 
from cyber-attack. On the other hand, the fact that these systems are not inherently 
integrated magnifies the challenges in maintaining a good COP between multiple 
different systems and functions on the battlefield. One of ARCYBER’s missions involves 
determining a way to integrate these systems while still protecting them from cyber-
attack.165   
The plans to integrate cyber warfare operations into all aspects of conventional 
Army operations are reflected in the ARCYBER strategic plan. This plan outlines four 
primary lines of effort for ARCYBER to achieve its ultimate objective to “conduct 
effective cyberspace, signal, and electronic warfare operations in the cyber domain in 
support of Unified Land Operations.”166  The lines of effort all support this objective. 
First, ARCYBER will transform the existing signal center facilities on Fort Meade, 
Maryland, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Fort Gordon, Georgia into the new ARCYBER 
headquarters and Center of Excellence. Second, ARCYBER will work to develop new 
cyber-qualified soldiers and leaders to operate the Army’s cyber force structure. Third, 
ARCYBER will develop and refine cyber doctrine and concepts for the Army. Fourth, 
and finally, ARCYBER will work to integrate cyber operations into the full spectrum of 
Army operations, known as Unified Land Operations.167   
ARCYBER was formed primarily using existing force structures consisting of 
INSCOM and NETCOM, both of which are headquarters or command type elements, 
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indicating they are not deployable troop units. Subordinate to INSCOM in the command 
hierarchy is the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade, consisting of a headquarters and two 
battalions, the 781st Military Intelligence Battalion and the 782nd Military Intelligence 
Battalion. The mission of the 780th is to conduct signals intelligence, conduct computer 
network operations and network defense, assist conventional forces in network defense, 
and deny adversaries freedom of action in cyberspace.   
Subordinate to NETCOM in the command hierarchy is the 1st Information 
Operations Command, which consists of a headquarters and two battalions, the 1st 
Information Operations Battalion and the 2nd Information Operations Battalion. The 
mission of the 1st is to provide information operations field support teams, conduct 
vulnerability assessments, conduct operational security (OPSEC) assessments, and 
conduct cyber warfare operations.168     
In addition to these elements, ARCYBER has as a direct reporting unit known as 
the Army Cyber Protection Brigade (CPB), which consists of two battalions comprised of 
multiple Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs). These teams are able to “rapidly evaluate, and 
act in response to unexpected and dynamic cyber situations, defending the nation in 
response to hostile action and imminent cyber threats.”169  While the CPB is designed to 
respond quickly to cyber incidents within Army systems anywhere in the world, and is 
primarily focused on defensive cyber operations, it also has the capability to disrupt 
adversary networks in support of conventional operations.170   
The final arms of ARCYBER’s force structure exist within the Army Reserve and 
Army National Guard. These components have military intelligence and information 
operations elements that support the missions of the 1st Information Operations 
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Command and 780th Military Intelligence Brigade. Also, portions of the CPTs are made 
up of reserve component soldiers in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. They 
are activated to augment active Army CPTs during deployments during high operational 
tempo (OPTEMPO) periods when the inventory of active Army CPTs has been exhausted 
or are not ready to deploy on consecutive tours. The bulk of ARCYBER’s force structure 
is stationed at Fort Meade, Fort Belvoir, and Fort Gordon, with the headquarters located 
at Fort Meade.171   
ARCYBER faced a significant challenge in gathering enough soldiers to fill 
positions in the new force structures created in 2010. Prior to the creation of ARCYBER, 
cyber-related military education was limited to a few specialized positions within the 
Army Signal School at Fort Gordon. Cyberspace-related education was sparse for officers 
and enlisted personnel entering the Army, and a system did not exist to train and certify 
personnel in the myriad of different skill sets required of a cyber operator. Supporters of 
cyber education in the years leading up to ARCYBER’s creation argued for a multi-
discipline approach to cyber education, meaning a combination of civilian education 
through colleges and technical schools, military education (both initial entry and 
advanced schooling), and information technology certifications through Microsoft, Cisco, 
and a number of other companies. All agreed that the amount of training required to bring 
a new soldier from initial entry into the Army to a fully-qualified cyber operator was cost 
and time prohibitive at best.172   
This disconnect required the development of an entirely new career path within 
the Army, which had not been done since the creation of the Special Forces, 
Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs branches in the 1970s. This process required 
an analysis of all of the different existing branches within the Army that had ‘pieces’ of 
the cyber mission in order to find a way to consolidate these functions into a new, all-
encompassing branch. ARCYBER worked with the Army Human Resources Command 
(HRC) to develop career tracks and benchmarks for promotion and assignments for 
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personnel in the new branch, commencing with lateral transfers of personnel in higher 
ranks and establishing a method for them to requalify as cyber operators so the new force 
structure would have qualified senior-grade leaders. This involves a long process, 
because it requires years for new soldiers entering the Army as cyber operators to grow 
and move up through the ranks to take on these leadership roles in the future.173   
The Army is leaning forward with educating officers in cyber operations. An 
example of this involves the annual Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX) held at the U.S. 
Military Academy at West Point, which pits cadets from all of the service academies 
against one another to test their ability to defend computer networks against cyber-
attacks. This exercise has been held annually since 2001, but has seen a surge in attention 
and participation since 2008. Participants in this exercise are preparing to become leaders 
in the Army’s new cyber branch, and cadets will leave West Point to become leaders 
within ARCYBER. This type of event is an indication of how early in the education of 
Army soldiers cyber education needs to start in order to have qualified and certified cyber 
operators in the force when they are needed.174   
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined a possible solution to the shortfalls in Army DSCA 
capabilities identified in the previous chapters. The DSCA Corps (FA20) can provide the 
Army with a dedicated group of DSCA professionals, trained and proficient in DSCA 
operations, and closely tied in with civil authorities at every level of government. While 
not the only possible solution to the identified shortfalls, this solution may be the most 
effective way to systematically address these issues effectively over the long term. The 
next chapter will address implementation of the DSCA Corps.   
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will address the challenges with creating a DSCA branch within the 
Army, including trade-offs with force structure requirements and budgetary limitations. It 
is predictable that the most significant resistance to this change will be due to funding, 
which can be in short supply, and that it will require reductions in other force structure to 
facilitate it effectively. This chapter will show a timeline for implementation, starting 
with approval and ending will fully functional DSCA Corps units. It will conclude with 
opportunities for future research, and a summary and conclusions section for the thesis.      
B. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
 There are a number of challenges and limitations to the successful implementation 
of the DSCA Corps (FA20) within the Army. There is an important distinction between a 
challenge and a limitation. Challenge is defined as, “something needing great mental or 
physical effort in order to be done successfully, or the situation of facing this kind of 
effort.”175  Challenges can be overcome through leadership, policies, and regulations. 
Limitation is defined as, “the act of controlling, or something that controls.”176  
Limitations require more significant changes to appropriations or law, such as acts of 
Congress or Executive Orders. The recommendations in Chapter V represent significant 
changes to Army DSCA doctrine and regulations as well as changes in federal 
appropriations; thus it is important to address these challenges and limitations.  
1. Challenges 
There are three major challenges to the implementation of the DSCA Corps 
(FA20). First, in order to achieve support from command elements throughout the Army, 
this change needs to be appropriately publicized and justified across the Army. Second, 
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this change requires a culture shift within the Army that recognizes the importance of the 
DSCA mission. Third, the unique force structure of the DSCA Corps requires a great deal 
of coordination between the Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard that 
is not normally required.   
The most significant challenge facing the implementation of FA20 is to gain the 
support of the Army’s senior leadership and high-ranking commanders, including Title 
10 and Title 32. This can be difficult, as was seen when the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 
1986 was signed into law. Goldwater-Nichols established the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the military advisor to the President and leader of the JCS, as 
well as establishing a Vice Chairman position. It also formalized the chain of command 
from the President, through the SecDef and CJCS, then to the chiefs of each of the 
services. At that time, assignment to a joint duty position was seen by most military 
personnel as detrimental to their career. As a result, services provided sub-standard 
personnel to fill joint billets, which reduced the effectiveness of the joint enterprise as a 
whole. It was not until after 9/11 that senior leaders in the services began pushing the 
importance of joint duty assignments within their formations. The DSCA Corps could 
face the same challenges within the Army without support from senior leaders and 
commanders.177   
In addition, a culture shift must occur within the Army towards recognizing the 
importance of DSCA because of the increasing potential homeland challenges due to 
weather changes as well as globalizing nature of war. Traditionally, DSCA has been 
viewed as a secondary mission for Army forces. While it is true that the primary mission 
of the Army is to conduct combat operations overseas and support the Homeland Defense 
missions of the DOD, DSCA must be more than an afterthought if the Army is to be 
successful in this critical function. Some steps have been taken in this regard. The 
creation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), 
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP), and Homeland Response Forces 
(HRF) within the National Guard, all part of the CBRNE Response Enterprise (CRE), 
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since 9/11 shows that the Army and the DOD recognize the unique role they play in 
supporting Homeland Security and providing DSCA. With the exception of the WMD-
CSTs, all of the CRE formations are mission assignments to traditional units with 
different combat missions; new units with dedicated missions were not formed to conduct 
these missions. Also, the CRE is focused solely on CBRNE Consequence Management, 
rather than all-hazards emergency response, which limits their support capabilities for the 
majority of disasters that require DSCA.   
Finally, the implementation of the DSCA Corps requires a high level of 
coordination and integration between Title 10 and Title 32 formations. This type of 
coordination is common within the Army, but the Active Army, Army Reserve, and 
Army National Guard remain distinctly separate in every way below the Department of 
the Army (DA) level. The formations proposed for the DSCA Corps require an integrated 
chain of command that includes personnel and units from each component of the Army 
spread across all 54 states and territories. In order for the DSCA Corps to effectively 
execute the DSCA mission before, during, and after disasters, a high degree of 
coordination and integration is needed to ensure plans and operations are consistent at 
every echelon and across the country.   
2. Limitations 
 There are also two significant limitations to the DSCA Corps implementation. 
First, and most significant, is that the current budget for the Department of the Army 
would need to be altered and potentially increased to facilitate this change. Second, the 
Army’s force structure needs to be modified to accommodate this change, which requires 
either a net increase in the size of the force or reductions in other branches and functional 
areas in order to accommodate.   
At this time, the DOD is experiencing consistent annual reductions in its overall 
budget, which affects each of the services. Implementation of the DSCA Corps will 
require funding to train personnel and provide new formations with facilities, equipment, 
and an operating budget. While the budgetary requirements will be less significant than 
those required to create the Cyber branch in 2010, due to the technological nature of the 
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Cyber branch, they still represent a net increase in the Army’s budget. This would 
necessitate budgetary reductions for other programs, which may be prohibitive to 
achieving support from senior leaders in the Army.   
Secondly, creation of new DSCA formations will require either an increase in the 
number of units the Army has been authorized to field by Congress or a reduction in 
formations from other branches and functional areas. This would put the Army in a 
position that they would need to reduce their combat power and capabilities in other areas 
to a small degree in order to facilitate the new DSCA units. This problem would be faced 
by the Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard, each of which will have 
different priorities and requirements competing with this initiative. The personnel 
requirement is not equally distributed between each component, as illustrated in Table 5. 
The largest impact is to the National Guard, which would need to collectively provide 
over 6,000 soldiers to support the new DSCA Corps units. Overall, the Army’s personnel 
requirement is 7,640 soldiers, which is roughly the size of two infantry brigade combat 
teams.   
Table 5.   DSCA Corps Personnel Requirements 





Active Army DSCA Group 2 180 360 
Army Reserve DSCA Battalion 10 80 800 
National Guard DSCA Company 54 120 6,480 
Total Army DSCA Corps 66 - 7,640 
 
C. TRANSITION 
 Based on the example set by the creation of the Cyber Branch, which began in 
2010 and culminated in 2016, we can predict the steps that must be taken and the time 
that will be needed to bring the DSCA Corps from ideation to fruition within the Army 
force structure. There are differences between the Cyber Branch and the DSCA 
Functional Area. The fact that Cyber is a branch requires a more robust proponent and 
overhead than a functional area requires. This required more time and money than are 
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needed for the DSCA Corps implementation. The Cyber Branch force structure was 
created by realigning existing units, where the DSCA Corps will require standing up new 
units. This will require more time and potentially more money for the DSCA Corps than 
was required for the Cyber Branch. This transition to a fully functional DSCA Corps can 
best be accomplished in three phases: creation, fielding, and integration.  
1. Creation 
This first phase involved the creation of FA20 and the DSCA Corps units. For 
FA20, the POI for qualifying personnel in this new career field needs to be created and 
tested for functionality. FA20 information needs to be incorporated into existing career 
management regulations and the Army’s personnel management automation systems. 
Personnel already meeting the requirements for qualification can be ‘grandfathered’ into 
FA20. The new DSCA Corps units will be created within the Army’s force management 
models and placed at various installations as outlined in Chapter V. The Army will create 
Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) to begin assigning personnel to the new 
units. Army DSCA regulations and manuals will be updated to incorporate the DSCA 
Corps models into existing Army DSCA doctrine. At the end of this phase, all 
administrative processes to facilitate the creation of the FA20 functional area and the 
DSCA Corps units will be complete.   
2. Fielding 
In this phase, personnel will be assigned to the new DSCA Corps units. Once 
personnel are assigned, they can attend FA20 qualification courses to become qualified to 
perform their new duties. Units will become operational at their assigned facilities and 
begin interacting with their new command structures under the guidance and direction of 
ARNORTH. Required facility improvements or modifications will be done as needed and 
each unit will be fielded equipment as dictated by the unit TDAs. Equipment such as 
computers, radios, and vehicles will take time to be fully fielded. At the end of this phase, 
all DSCA Corps units will be fully manned and equipped and all personnel will be fully 
trained as FA20 soldiers.   
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3. Integration 
In this phase, the DSCA Corps units will begin operations according to their 
mission and priorities assigned to them by ARNORTH. They will begin integrating with 
federal, regional, state, and local civil authorities to conduct liaison and build 
relationships with key agencies and individuals. This phase is ongoing as the DSCA 
Corps becomes the lead Army element for all DSCA missions.   
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
1. Summary of Findings 
This thesis illustrated that there are several significant shortfalls in the way the 
Army and the DOD provides DSCA in response to major or catastrophic disasters.   In 
Chapter III, the description of DOD’s response during Hurricane Sandy and its 
involvement in the Cascadia Rising 2016 earthquake response exercise highlighted the 
issues that need to be resolved. The main shortfalls identified in Chapter IV are as 
follows: 
1. Civil-Military Liaison 
2. Pre-Disaster Relationship Building 
3. Soldier Education and Training 
4. Knowledge and Expertise 
5. Planning 
6. Anticipation of Needs 
The Army and DOD have made efforts since Hurricane Katrina to correct these 
shortfalls. Various entities throughout the Army, especially in the National Guard, have 
made efforts to improve integration and coordination between military and civilian 
agencies. Most of these efforts have been at the federal level between USNORTHCOM, 
ARNORTH, NGB, and partnering civilian agencies such as FEMA and the FBI. These 
efforts have had limited success in correcting the functional shortfalls experienced during 
real-world disaster response situations. A major change is needed to correct these 
problems once and for all.   
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2. Recent Developments 
During the process of research and preparation of this thesis, a series of major 
hurricanes struck the southeast United States. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria made 
landfall at various points from Texas to Florida beginning in August 2017 and continuing 
through late September 2017. At the time of this writing, there is little publicly-available 
information regarding successes or shortfalls with the military responses to these three 
hurricanes. There are dozens of news articles that discuss the work the military is doing 
to support hurricane relief efforts, such as search and rescue, delivery of food and water, 
and assistance with flood mitigation. These are all great stories that show how effective 
DSCA can be, but they do not speak to the topics addressed in this thesis.   
There is evidence that the DOD has taken the hard lessons from the Hurricane 
Sandy response to heart, though. Chapter III of this thesis discusses the Hurricane Sandy 
response, identifying several shortfalls. One of these shortfalls was a presidential 
directive from President Obama, given in a speech at the time, in which he stated, “We’re 
not going to tolerate any red tape. We’re not going to tolerate any bureaucracy.”178  
While well-intentioned, this directive resulted in commands from the DOD to 
USNORTHCOM and ultimately to field commanders to, “Get missions; Do not wait for 
mission assignment paperwork… When you get a mission: execute. Clean up paperwork 
later.”179  The confusion that resulted in the hurricane response was clear, especially 
when a Marine Expeditionary Unit landed on Manhattan Island without prior request or 
authorization. The story is different with the recent responses to Harvey, Irma, and Maria. 
On September 1, 2017, in heat of the response to Hurricane Harvey, USNORTHCOM 
Commander General Lori Robinson relayed a directive from SecDef James Mattis 
regarding the military response. Robinson stated, “He made the comment to me: ‘Lori, 
Texas gets everything they need, and we’ll get it there as fast as we can.’”180  This is a 
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departure from the high-level directives seen in the Hurricane Sandy response five years 
earlier, when the President and senior DOD officials encouraged field commanders to 
ignore established processes in the interest of speed of response, and at the expense of a 
coordinated response. Mattis states that the state of Texas will receive any support they 
need from the DOD, implying that Texas must tell the DOD what it needs before the 
resources will come at the greatest speed possible.   
In the coming months, more information will come to light that will show whether 
or not the DOD and the Army made any improvements to their DSCA processes based on 
lessons learned from the Hurricane Sandy response. The responses to both Hurricane 
Harvey and Hurricane Irma are on scale with Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. Hurricane 
Harvey saw the activation and employment of over 19,000 National Guardsmen and over 
6,300 Title 10 personnel.181  Hurricane Irma saw the activation and employment of over 
13,000 National Guardsmen and over 4,500 Title 10 personnel.182  At the time of this 
writing, the DOD is shifting resources from the Hurricane Irma response to respond to 
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands; the total numbers of military 
personnel involved is unknown.183  In comparison, the total military response to 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was over 50,000 National Guardsmen and over 20,000 Title 
10 personnel. While these recent hurricane responses have not yet reached this level, they 
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very easily could due to the expected long duration of recovery efforts that may require 
military support.184 
3. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter outlines the importance and a plan for creating a DSCA Corps 
(FA20) within the Army aimed at correcting the identified shortfalls. The DSCA Corps 
would create a set of units filled with DSCA specialists who can be the lead element in 
the Army for all DSCA missions. These units would be responsible for conducting liaison 
and relationship building with civilian agencies at every level of government, from 
federal to local. They would integrate into the planning processed for civilian agencies 
with the goal of anticipating their needs and facilitating the rapid deployment of Title 32 
and Title 10 forces during a disaster. These soldiers would also serve as key facilitators of 
communication between civilian agencies and traditional Army formations, ensuring 
cohesive and integrated operations during any disaster response.   
A dedicated DSCA Corps is not the only potential solution to the shortfalls 
identified in this thesis. Other scholarly works from the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Army War College, and Army Command and General Staff College have suggested that 
these shortfalls can be corrected by improving or increasing the available DSCA training 
for Army personnel. Still others have address problems and gaps in DSCA laws, doctrine, 
policies, and regulations that, if changed, could address the identified shortfalls. While 
beneficial in advancing the study and practice of DSCA, these solutions do not go far 
enough to address the core of the problems identified in this the previous chapters. The 
constant turnover of personnel within the Army and within the civilian agencies with 
which the Army works for DSCA missions results in a constant need to train new people. 
By creating a core of DSCA SMEs, such as the DSCA Corps, the Army can solve this 
problem and the other problems identified in this thesis.   
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The DSCA Corps concept needs to be implemented immediately within the 
Army. In spite of the budgetary restrictions the Army currently faces and the challenges 
presented by this change, our responsibility as soldiers and Americans is to do all we can 
to provide life-saving assistance to civilians during their time of greatest need. Failing to 
do everything in our power to ensure we can be readily and rapidly deployed where we 
are needed is counter to the Army values and our mission to defend the United States 
against all enemies, both foreign and domestic.   
4. Future Research 
There are two main areas of research that will further the discussion of 
improvements to the Army’s DSCA capabilities. First is research into the DSCA 
capabilities of the Army’s sister services, the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Each 
of the services has been given leeway by the DOD to address their DSCA requirements 
as they deem most appropriate. A comparison of the DSCA capabilities of the Army and 
its sister services may show where the Army is ahead of or behind the other services in 
the realm of DSCA. Second is research into the DSCA capabilities of allied foreign 
militaries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel, and Japan. Every nation has 
different laws that govern the use of armed forces for disaster response activities within 
its borders. While many of the practices that these nations engage in may not be 
transferrable to the U.S. due to differences in federal and state laws, there are likely to be 
practices that can be imported to the U.S. to make the Army more effective during DSCA 
missions.   
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